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The Evolution and Decline of the 
Effective-Vindication Doctrine in U.S. 
Arbitration Law 
 
Okezie Chukwumerije* 
   
INTRODUCTION 
This Article evaluates the role of the effective-vindication doctrine in 
U.S. arbitration law.  Conceived as a means of ensuring that arbitration is an 
effective mechanism for vindicating federal statutory rights, the doctrine has 
played an important role in promoting access to justice.  However, the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Rest.1 has severely restricted the availability of the doctrine.  This article 
examines the broad policy implications of the Court’s narrow interpretation 
of the doctrine. 
Over the years, the Court has adopted an expansive interpretation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2  As a result, it has broadened the reach and 
scope of the Act beyond what was intended by its drafters.  The Court has 
interpreted the Act as reflecting both the “fundamental principle that 
arbitration is a matter of contract,”3 and a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”4  Consequently, the Court has sought to put arbitration 

* Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Houston, Texas. I wish to thank Devin 
Vickers for her research assistance, and Rebecca Stewart for her helpful comments. All errors are 
my own. 
1.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013)., 186 L. Ed. 2d 417, 2013 
U.S. LEXIS 4700, 81 U.S.L.W. 4483, 163 Lab. Cas. (CCH) P10,607, 2013-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
P78,432, 24 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 337, 2013 WL 3064410 (U.S. 2013).(2013). 
2.  9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, 201-08, 301-07 (2006). 
3.  Rent-A-Ctr,., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010). 
4.  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). It should 
be noted that  some observers have observed that the FAA was not intended to favor arbitration but 
1
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agreements “on an equal footing with other contracts.”5  Consistent with 
what it perceives as the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA, the Court has 
liberalized the availability of arbitration by narrowly construing the grounds 
under which arbitration agreements can be invalidated under the FAA’s 
“savings clause”6 and by transferring an increasing array of gateway issues 
to arbitrators.  
The effect of the Court’s expansive interpretation of the FAA is 
particularly felt in consumer and employment transactions.  Claims arising 
from these transactions often implicate statutory rights that afford vital 
protections to consumers and employees.  Additionally, the monetary value 
of many of these claims is so small as to make individual prosecution 
economically unfeasible.  As a result, there is the question of whether these 
claims, which implicate vital statutory rights, should be arbitrable, and if so, 
whether there should be safeguards to ensure that arbitration is a fair arena 
for resolving these disputes.  
At the time the FAA was drafted, there were some indications that it 
was intended to facilitate the arbitration of commercial disputes between 
businesses.7  Arbitration was infrequently used outside the commercial 
context during this period.  In fact, some commentators felt that the FAA 
was intended to have limited application with respect to employment 
disputes8 and was not envisaged to apply to the resolution of consumer 
disputes.  As one commentator has noted, the “FAA was intended to 
facilitate self-regulation within commercial communities, not to regulate 
relationships between consumers and large corporations in arm’s length, 
anonymous transactions.”9  Nonetheless, the Court has made it clear that the 

to prohibit discrimination against arbitration agreements. See Rhonda Wasserman, Legal Process in 
a Box, or What Class Action Waivers Teach Us About Law-Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 391, 395-
96 (2012). 
5.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011). 
6.  Section 2 of the Act provides that an arbitration agreement may be invalidated “upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. §2. 
7.  See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement 
of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 
466-67 (1996) (arguing that “[t]he unrebutted legislative history created prior to the FAA's passage 
establishes that only disputes arising out of commercial contracts were to be arbitrable.”). 
8.   See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Has Created 
a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 100 (2006) 
(arguing that the Court has interpreted the FAA “to cover worker agreements, which had been 
expressly excluded by Congress.”). 
9.  Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 942 (1999). 
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Act applies to the arbitration of employment and consumer disputes, even 
where these disputes implicate statutory rights.  
On the issue of appropriate safeguards, the “savings clause” of the FAA 
allows the invalidation of arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”10  To a large 
extent, state courts have used the unconscionability doctrine for ensuring the 
fairness of the arbitral process in these transactions.  Recognizing that class 
actions are sometimes the only effective means of prosecuting low-value 
claims by consumers and employees, some state courts have used 
unconscionability to regulate the enforceability of class action waivers in 
arbitration agreements.  However, the Court in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion11 severely limited the availability of this mechanism. 
Concepcion held that the FAA precludes states from conditioning the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements on the availability of class 
proceedings.  It held that this is the case even if “class proceedings are 
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through 
the legal system.”12  
Post-Concepcion, the effective-vindication doctrine was the remaining 
avenue open to prospective claimants for resisting the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements that practically immunize defendants from liability 
for violating federal statutory rights.  Prospective claimants sought to avoid 
the effect of the Court’s decision in Concepcion by arguing that class action 
waivers should not be enforced where their enforcement would prevent a 
party from vindicating his or her statutory rights.13 
Amex has now narrowed the availability of the effective-vindication 
doctrine as grounds for invalidating arbitration agreements.  In Amex, the 
Court reaffirmed its view that the FAA’s “command to enforce arbitration 
agreement trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value 
claims.”14  The Court limited effective-vindication challenges to situations 

10.  9 U.S.C. § 2. 
11. 131 S. Ct. at 1745.5. 
12.  Id. at 1753. 
13.  See Andrew J. Pincus & Archis A. Parasharami, Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to 
Arbitration Agreements, Class Defense Blog, (June 20, 2013),  
http://www.classdefenseblog.com/2013/06/20/supreme-court-rejects-challenge-to-arbitration-
agreements//. 
14.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5. 
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where an arbitration agreement precludes the assertion of certain statutory 
rights and cases where filing and administrative fees in arbitration “are so 
high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”15  The Court interpreted 
the doctrine as protecting only a notional “right to pursue” statutory claims,16 
a right that is not implicated either by the prohibitive costs of “proving a 
statutory remedy” or by the waiver of class action proceedings. 
The practical consequence of the Court’s severely restrictive 
interpretation of the doctrine is to make the doctrine less relevant in ensuring 
access to justice.  This effect will be particularly felt by consumers, 
employees, and other small-value claimants.  For these claimants, the 
doctrine was one of a diminishing range of options for resisting the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements that inhibit effective redress for 
violations of statutory rights.  Amex has narrowly delineated the nature and 
extent of inquiry a court can make when considering an effective-vindication 
challenge.  By reducing the scope of the doctrine, the Court made it easier 
for carefully drafted arbitration agreements to be used to deprive prospective 
claimants of the opportunity to vindicate their statutory rights. 
Amex is best understood in the broader context of the Court’s continuing 
efforts to interpret statutes and regulations in a manner that essentially 
insulates corporations from liability risks.17  Amex is one of several recent 
decisions of the Court that consolidates this project.  For example, the 
decisions of the Court in its last session included one that put new 
restrictions on lawsuits claiming on-the–-job harassment18 and another that 
held that two million cable customers who filed an antitrust suit against 
Comcast had not established a common method to determine monetary 
damages.19  With these decisions, the Court continues a pattern of narrowing 
“the avenues available to employees and consumers seeking to take their 
grievance before a judge.”20  Furthermore, the Court continues to reduce the 
grounds for challenging class action waivers affecting consumers, 
employees, and other small-value claimants.  Justice Kagan views Amex as 
part of this latter trend.  According to her, the majority focused narrowly on 
the class action waiver instead of concentrating on the broader effect of the 

15.  Id. at 2310–11. 
16.  Id. 
17.  See Paul M. Barrett, The Supreme Court: Corporate America’s Employees of the Month, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 1, 2013, at 21, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-06-
27/the-supreme-court-corporate-americas-employees-of-the-month. 
18.  See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013). 
19.  See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
20.  Barrett, supra note 17.17. 
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entire arbitration agreement on the ability of the claimants to vindicate their 
statutory rights, because “[t]o a hammer, everything looks like a nail.”21  In 
her view, “to a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23,22 
everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”23 
The Court’s decision in Amex was informed by an expansive reading of 
the scope of the FAA.  The Court has interpreted the Act as embodying an 
almost irrefutable preference for arbitration, even when this preference is at 
odds with the realities of the difficulties of vindicating statutory rights.  This 
is even so when enforcement of an arbitration agreement would undermine 
the realization of the policies enshrined in other federal statutes.  In this 
context, Amex intensifies the Court’s fetishizing of arbitration.  Its sweeping 
declaration that “[t]he FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements 
trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims” would 
have surprised even the most ardent advocates of the enactment of the Act.24 
Amex affords an opportunity for the evaluation of the effective 
vindication doctrine and an assessment of the potential import of the 
decision on access to justice.  This article explains how the doctrine serves 
the important role of reconciling the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration 
agreements with the need to ensure the vindication of statutory rights 
embodied in federal command statues.  It argues that the Court’s restrictive 
interpretation of the doctrine in Amex would inhibit the redress of legitimate 
statutory claims and suggests that a legislative response is required so that 
arbitration continues to be an effective means of resolving disputes.  Without 
such a solution, the Court’s continuous weakening of challenges to the 

21.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2320. 
22.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1. 
23.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2320. 
24.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2320, n.5. Critiquing the Court’s 
expansive interpretation of the scope of the FAA, Justice Stevens  has observed that “[t]here is little 
doubt that the Court’s interpretation of the [FAA] has given it a scope far beyond the expectations of 
Congress in enacting it.” Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: the Forthcoming, Near-Total 
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 430 n.115. In a similar vein, Justice 
O’Connor has noted that “[t]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent 
with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”  Id.  The 
Court had adopted this broad interpretation of the FAA, often without taking into account the 
substantive considerations of consent and the contractual context. See Amy J. Schmitz, 
Considerations of ‘“Contracting Culture” in Enforcing Arbitration Provision, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. 123 (2007). 
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fairness of the arbitral process would put the legitimacy of the process into 
question.   
Part I of this Article traces the evolution of judicial and legislative 
attitude towards arbitration.  In this part, I discuss how the FAA was 
intended to reverse the traditional judicial hostility toward arbitration by 
promoting the enforcement of arbitration agreements in commercial 
transactions.  I argue that the Court’s subsequent expansive interpretation of 
the FAA is inconsistent with the policy considerations that informed the 
enactment of the Act.  The extreme pro arbitration posture adopted by the 
Court is compelled neither by the context nor the text of the Act. In reading 
the Act so expansively, the Court has significantly enlarged the scope of the 
Act, practically eliminated the ability of states to regulate the availability of 
arbitration agreements where necessary to protect the weak, and severely 
limited the grounds for resisting enforcement of arbitration agreements.  Part 
II examines the development of the effective vindication doctrine.  It situates 
this discussion in the context of the Court’s approval of the arbitration of 
statutory claims and the attendant need to reconcile the FAA’s policy 
promoting the enforcement of arbitration agreements with the need to ensure 
the vindication of rights embodied in other federal statutes.  I discuss the 
policy considerations informing the doctrine and examine how it has been 
used to address the problems of expenses associated with arbitration, 
structural bias in arbitration, and class action waivers. Part III evaluates both 
the Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in Amex.  The discussion focuses 
on the weaknesses in the arguments used by the majority to support its 
narrow interpretation of the doctrine.  I argue that the Court’s narrow 
interpretation is at odds with the policy considerations underlying the 
doctrine and cannot easily be reconciled with the Court’s prior teachings on 
the role of the doctrine.  Part IV explores the implication of the decisions, 
particularly on the prosecution of small value claims and on the effective 
vindication of rights embodied in state laws.  Part V argues that a legislative 
response has become necessary to assure the continued legitimacy of 
arbitration as a fair and effective mechanism for resolving disputes.  
6
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I. TRACING THE EVOLUTION IN JUDICIAL ATTITUDE TOWARDS 
ARBITRATION 
Although arbitration has existed in various forms over the centuries,25 
there was an initial judicial hostility towards the process.  This hostility was 
explained in part by a fear that arbitration ousted the jurisdiction of the 
courts and a suspicion that arbitrators may not be as vigilant in protecting the 
interests of justice as judges are.  The judicial suspicion of arbitration in the 
common law tradition arose in England and spread to other common law 
jurisdictions.  In England, the court’s traditional cautious attitude towards 
arbitration is reflected in Lord Coke’s dictum in the Vynior’s Case, where he 
ordered the enforcement of an arbitration award but noted that a party may 
countermand a predispute agreement to arbitrate.26  He compared predispute 
arbitration agreements to revocable powers of attorney or revocable 
provisions of a will.  In his view, to bar the revocation of a predispute 
arbitration agreement would be tantamount to making “not countermandable 
[that] which is by law and of its own nature countermandable.”27  Under this 
view, either party could renege on its promise to arbitrate if the promise was 
made before an actual dispute arose between the contracting parties.  The 
consideration underlying this restrictive view of the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements was made evident in Kill v. Hollister28, where the 
court held that “the agreement of the parties [to arbitrate their dispute] 
cannot oust [the jurisdiction of] this court.”29  Jealous of their jurisdictions 
and afraid that arbitration was a means of whittling it down, courts used the 
dictum in Kill as justification for refusing to enforce predispute arbitration 
agreements.30  Ultimately, a contrary stream of authority, culminating in 

25.  Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking The Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.. 637, 680 (1996). 
26.  Steven J. Burton in The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, 
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 474 (2006); see 
also 8 Co. Rep. 80a. 
27.  Id. at 81b–82a. 
28.  18 Geo. 2, 1 Wils 129. 
29.  Id. 
30.  See David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The 
Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67-SPG LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 5, 1652 (2004). 
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Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisher,31 did hold that predispute arbitration agreements 
were enforceable.32  
The judicial attitude in the United States towards arbitration took the 
same trajectory as in England, initial suspicion and gradual, if grudging, 
acceptance.  The traditional judicial suspicion of arbitration was exemplified 
in early New York decisions which viewed Coke’s dictum as an articulation 
of a settled principle of English law and used it as justification for holding 
predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable.33  However, with time, 
judicial attitude towards arbitration became more relaxed and several states 
enacted legislation permitting the enforcement of predispute arbitration 
agreements.34  This more relaxed attitude towards arbitration came to be 
embodied in the FAA.  Enacted in 1925, the Act was designed to promote 
the enforcement of arbitration agreements by making them “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”35  
The FAA has played an important role in the increasing use of 
arbitration in resolving a broad range of disputes.  The Court’s interpretation 
of its scope, reach, and command has significantly affected access to justice 
in the United States and constrained the ability of states to respond to access 
and fairness issues in arbitrations.  Amex illustrates how the Court’s 
expansive interpretation of the FAA has led to the privileging of the pro-
arbitration mandate of the Act over other competing public policy 
considerations. 
In its decision in Amex, the majority of the Supreme Court justified its 
rejection of the applicability of the effective vindication defense by 
reference to key insights it gleaned from the FAA. According to the Court, 
the FAA “reflects the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of 

31.  William Schofield, Hamlyn & Co. v. Talisker Distillery: A Study in the Conflict of Laws, 
9 HARV. L. REV. 371 (1896). 
32.  In fact, the English Arbitration Act of 1889 had provided a framework for a more 
congenial judicial attitude towards arbitration. The Act made arbitration and submission agreements 
irrevocable, provided for the finality of arbitral awards, and empowered arbitrators to summon 
witnesses and examine them under oath. 
33.  For a review of these early New York cases, see Current Legislation, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 
822 (1925). 
34.  Id. at 823 (citing legislation in New York, New Jersey, Oregon, and Massachusetts 
providing for the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate). The New York legislation, whose 
enactment was spearheaded by Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer, is considered the first modern 
state arbitration statute. See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION—
NATIONALIZATION – INTERNALIZATION 28, 34–37 (1992). 
35.  9 U.S.C. §2. 
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contract” and requires courts to “‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration agreements 
according to their terms.”36 Unless Congress otherwise indicates, courts 
must enforce arbitration agreements even where a violation of a federal 
statute is alleged.37 The central purpose of the FAA “is the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements on their terms.”38 To the Court, there is an overriding 
interest in realizing this purpose with the result that “the FAA’s command to 
enforce arbitration agreement trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution 
of low-value claims.”39  
It is remarkable that what began as a judicial suspicion of arbitration has 
transformed into a judicial veneration of arbitration, a transformation that 
has practical consequences for access to justice. This paper argues that while 
the FAA compels a more favorable attitude towards arbitration, the Court’s 
expansive reading of its reach and mandate would have surprised even the 
most ardent proponents of the Act.40  The Court’s expansive interpretation of 
the Act has been based largely on a contextual reading of the text.  As a 
result, the Court has not paid sufficient heed to the legislative history and 
historical context of the legislation, both of which would suggest a more 
restrained reading of the Act, not the expansive reading that now privileges 
the pro-arbitration mandate of the Act above other competing public policy 
considerations.41 
The major proponents of the FAA had in mind a bill of limited scope.42 
Julius Cohen and Charles Bernheimer, both of whom played major roles in 

36.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309.  See also § 2 of the FAA, 
which  provides that: 
[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction  
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such 
contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an 
agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a 
contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
37.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. at 2309. 
38.  Id. at 2312 n.5. 
39.  Id. 
40.  See, e.g., Moses, supra note 88, at 99. (arguing that “a simple procedural statute enacted 
to require enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal courts has become unrecognizable as the 
law Congress adopted in 1925.”). 
41.  Id. at 111. Instead the Court has, as one commentator has aptly observed, “built a house of 
cards that has almost no resemblance to the structure envisioned by the original statute.” Id. at 113. 
42.  Id. at 105. 
9
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the enactment of the first New York Arbitration Law, were instrumental in 
the passage of the FAA.43  The original FAA, which was modeled on the 
New York statute, was drafted principally by Julius Cohen.44  The 
testimonies by Cohen and Bernheimer during the Senate and 
Subcommittees’ hearings for the bill illuminate the considerations that 
motivated the passage of the bill.  Of primary concern to them and others 
who testified during the hearings was the need to move away from the 
traditional judicial suspicion of arbitration towards a legislative and judicial 
attitude that was more receptive to the arbitration of disputes between 
merchants.  They argued that businesses should be provided access to a 
simple, expeditious, and cheap method of resolving disputes, in contrast to 
the judicial system that was often congested, protracted, and expensive.45  In 
a brief submitted to Congress, Cohen emphasized that arbitration served the 
public interest as it provided a solution to some of the problems plaguing the 
legal system.46  
In a piece written shortly after the passage of the Act and substantially 
based on his brief to Congress, Cohen emphasized three key features of 
arbitration that informed the drafting process of the FAA: that arbitration 
was founded on the free consent of the contracting parties;47 that arbitration 

43.  Id. at 102. Julius Cohen, a lawyer, was the general counsel of the New York State 
Chamber of Commerce and Charles Bernheimer was the chair of the chamber’s arbitration 
committee. Id. 
44.  Id. at 102. 
45.  Id. at 103. In his testimony during the hearings, Bernheimer noted that “[A]rbitration 
saves time, … saves money . .  preserves business friendships . . . raises business standards. It 
maintains business honor, prevents unnecessary litigation, and eliminates the law’s delay in relieving 
our courts.” Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before 
the J. Comm. of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 7-8 (1924). [Hereinafter Joint Hearings]. 
46.  See Joint Hearings, supra note 45, at 34–35. 
47.  Cohen noted that arbitration agreements are entirely voluntary and that the FAA “is 
merely a new method for enforcing a contract freely made by the parties thereto.” Julius Henry 
Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 279 (1926). It is 
instructive to note that during his congressional testimony, he had suggested that the proposed act 
would not apply to adhesion contracts, suggesting that aversion to such contracts was one of the 
reasons for the traditional judicial suspicion of arbitration. According to him: 
[T]he real fundamental cause was that at the time this rule was made people were not able 
to take care of themselves in making contracts, and the stronger men would take 
advantage of the weaker, and the courts had to come in and protect them. And the courts 
said, “If you let the people sign away their rights, the powerful will come in and take 
away the rights of the weaker ones.” And that still is true to a certain extent. 
Joint Hearings, supra note 455 at 15. 
It was, therefore, envisaged that the Act would apply to genuinely consensual transaction, not 
agreements offered on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive customers or employees. See Prima 
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was well suited for resolving disputes between merchants; and that 
arbitration, even though useful in resolving business disputes, was “not the 
proper method for deciding points of law of major importance involving 
constitutional questions or policy in the application of statues.”48  He argued 
that arbitration was mostly relevant to: 
the disposition of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to questions of fact – 
quantity, quality, time of delivery, compliance with terms of payment, excuse for non-
performance, and the like. It has a place also in the determination of the simpler questions 
of law – the questions of law which arise out of these daily relations between merchants 
as to the passage of title, the existence of warranties, or [similar] questions of law.49 
 A then primary objective of the protagonists of the FAA was to 
provide an effective private mechanism for merchants to resolve business 
disputes.  The drafters did not envisage the FAA as placing the interest in the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements, even those that arise from adhesion 
contracts, ahead of competing public interests enshrined in other statutes.  
Their intent was more limited and they demonstrated a more nuanced 
understanding of the limits of arbitration as a method of resolving disputes. 
As one of those who testified during the congressional hearings noted, the 
FAA was “purely an act to give the merchants the right or the privilege of 
sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if 
they want to do it.  Now that is all there is in this.”50  In fact, there were 
indications that the Act was not intended to cover workers.51  
It was probably because of the modest intent of its proponents that the 
bill did not receive much opposition during the legislative process.  It passed 

Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 407, 414 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing 
Joint Hearings, supra note 45, at 9–11). 
48.  Cohen & Dayton, supra note 47, at 281. 
49.  Id. 
50.  Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal 
Commercial Arbitration: Hearings on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 40 (1923) [hereinafter Sales and Contracts] (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). 
He testified in his capacity as the chairman of the Committee of Trade and Commercial Law of the 
American Bar Association.  Id. 
51.  Sales and Contracts, supra note 50, at 9. After reviewing the legislative history of the Act, 
Margret Moses noted that “the supporters of the legislation did not believe that it would apply to any 
workers at all.” Moses, supra note 8, at 106. “Under the view of the Commerce Clause at that time, 
the Act did not apply to contracts of most workers.”  Id. “It only applied to contracts of workers 
actually engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, such as seamen or railroad employees, and those 
workers were specifically excluded.” Id.  
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in both houses of Congress without a negative vote.  The proposed bill 
would probably have been subject to contentious debate and opposition had 
those who voted for it foreseen what it would become several decades after 
its passage. 
Instructively, at the time the Act was passed, the use of arbitration was 
largely confined to commercial transactions between merchants.  There had 
not yet been the proliferation of the use of arbitration in consumer 
transactions.  In fact, commentators originally considered the Act as 
applying only to transactions involving interstate commerce.  Few 
transactions between large businesses and consumers would have implicated 
interstate commerce interests at the time the Act was passed.52  
Consequently, some commentators believed that the FAA was not envisaged 
to apply to such transactions.53  
Alabama adopted this restrictive interpretation of the FAA.  Alabama 
courts routinely limited the application of the FAA to cases where the parties 
to the transaction actively contemplated substantial interstate activity.54  
However, in consonance with its expansive view of the scope of the FAA, 
the Supreme Court subsequently rejected this narrow reading of the FAA, 
holding that the Act applied to the full extent of the modern commerce 
clause.55  In the same vein, it also held that the FAA applies broadly to 
transactions affecting interstate commerce in the aggregate, even where the 

52.  Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act’s Interstate Commerce Requirement: 
What’s Left for State Arbitration Law? 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385, 459 (1992). 
53.  Id. at 459. The author suggests that Congress may have felt that the regulation of 
consumer disputes was outside the scope of its powers under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 460 n.34. 
Accordingly, the phrase ‘”contracts evidencing a transaction involving commerce” [in § 2 of the 
Act] was considered as implicating foreign or interstate commerce in a narrow sense and not in the 
broad sense in which interstate commerce is understood contemporary constitutional doctrine. See 
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruh, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of the 
Federal Arbitration Law 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1430 (2008). The relevant portion of the Act 
provides as follows: “A written provision in . . .  a contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable . . . ” Id. at 1426. 
54.  Bruh, supra note 53, at 1430.  See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So.2d 
354, 355 (Ala. 1993); Thayer v. Am. Fin. Advisers, Inc., 322 N.W.2d 599, 603-04 (Minn. 1982). For 
other decisions adopting this approach, see Burke County Public Schools Bd. of Ed. v. Shaver 
Partnership, 279 S.E.2d 816 (N.C. 1981); R.J. Palmer Const. Co. v. Wichita Band Instrument Co., 
642 P.2d 127 (Kan. 1982); Lacheney v. Profitkey Intern, Inc. 818 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
There was, however, a contrary stream of authority that held that § 2 reached the limits of Congress’ 
power under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Snyder v. Smith, 736 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1984); Foster 
v. Turley, 808 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1986). 
55.  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.,. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. at 268. 
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particular transaction at issue may not have substantially affected interstate 
commerce.56  This substantially affected the reach of the FAA. 
Furthermore, most commentators initially believed that the Act was 
intended by Congress to apply to disputes concerning the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements in federal courts.57  As one commentator observed, 
“[f]or years, courts and commentators agreed that the statute applied only in 
the federal courts and so governed only the few contract suits that happened 
to involve diversity or admiralty jurisdiction.”58  On this view, the Act would 
have been inapplicable to most consumer transactions at the time it was 
enacted.59  The Supreme Court subsequently rejected this view.60  According 
to the Court, “[a]lthough the legislative history is not without ambiguities, 
there are strong indications that Congress had in mind something more than 
making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.”61  
This enlargement of the scope of application of the Act to state courts led to 
its application to a broad range of consumer transactions handled by state 
courts. 
Even though the Court adopted an expansive interpretation of the scope 
of the Act, its decisions on the mandate of the Act to enforce arbitration 
agreements were measured and demonstrated an appreciation of the 
historical context for the enactment of the statute.  It was only with time that 
it adopted the extreme pro-arbitration posture that has led it to severely limit 
the avenues for challenging the enforceability of arbitration agreements. 
This Court’s more nuanced approach to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements is exemplified by Wilko v. Swan.62  The Court had to decide the 
arbitrability of a claim brought by a customer of a securities brokerage firm 

56.  Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 55-57 (2003) (citing, Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942). 
57.  See, e.g., Strickland, supra note 52, at 391. 
58.  Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration 
Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1315 (1985). 
59.  Sternlight, supra note 25, at 693. As Jean Sternlight has noted, “assuming for the moment 
that the FAA was only intended to apply in federal court, and even assuming the parties were from 
diverse states, few large merchant/small consumer transactions could have met the federal court 
amount in controversy requirement in effect in 1924 of $3,000.” Id. at 712 n.44. 
60.  See Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), where the Supreme Court held, in a majority 
decision, that the FAA applied in both federal and state courts. 
61.   Id. at 12. 
62.  346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
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who sought to recover damages under the Securities Act.63  The suit alleged 
that as a result of “misrepresentations and omission of information” by the 
brokerage firm, the customer bought stock that he subsequently sold for a 
loss.64  When the brokerage firm moved to stay the action pending 
arbitration, the District Court denied the request on the grounds that to 
enforce the arbitration agreement would deprive the customer “of the 
advantageous court remedy afforded by the Securities Act.”65  On appeal, 
the Court of Appeals held that the Securities Act did not bar enforcement of 
the arbitration agreement.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide 
whether the Act’s language prohibiting the purchaser of any security from 
waiving any provision of the Act66 meant that agreements to arbitrate 
disputes arising from the Act were unenforceable.  The Court had to 
reconcile the language of the Securities Act with that of § 2 of the FAA 
making arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable and enforceable.”67  
In denying the petition to stay the action, the Supreme Court held that 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement would deny the plaintiff the 
protection afforded him by the Securities Act, which prohibited “waiver of 
judicial trial and review.”68  The Court’s decision was influenced by what it 
perceived as the inferiority of the arbitration forum for the vindication of 
statutory rights.  Even though the arbitrators would apply the Securities Act, 
the Court felt that it would be inappropriate to send the parties to arbitration.  
This was because the “effectiveness in application” of the Securities Act 
provisions would be “lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial 
proceedings.”69  In the Court’s view, “the protective provisions of the 
Securities Act require the exercise of judicial discretion to fairly assure their 
effectiveness.”70  The Court was swayed by what it perceived as some of the 
weaknesses of arbitration in this context: the fact that arbitrators are 
“without judicial instruction in the law,” that arbitrators could render awards 

63.  48 Stat. 84, 15 U. S. C. § 77n. 
64.  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 428–29. 
65.  Id. at 430. 
660 ) $#;>$))%'$+ ))956#-$# ) $#.() %*!) $#.$'%'$+ ( $# # #
#-%'($#&* ' ##-(*' )-)$, +$"%! #, )#-%'$+ ( $#$) ((*%)'
$'$)'*!(#'*!) $#($)$"" (( $#(!!+$ 09C0007;>0 
67.  Supra note 6. 
68.  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. at 437–38. In a subsequent decision, the Court refused to extend 
this finding to the Securities Exchange Act. See Shearson/Am Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 
(1987). 
69.  Id. at 435. 
70.  Id. at 437. 
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without explaining their reasons, and that there were limited grounds for 
vacating arbitral awards.71  It is instructive to note that the Court 
acknowledged that a similar arbitration clause would be enforceable in a 
commercial contract.72  Nonetheless, it felt that Congress’s intent in the 
Securities Act was better served by refusing to enforce arbitration 
agreements against individuals. 
Although Wilko dealt with a provision of the Securities Act specifically 
prohibiting “waiver of judicial trial and review,”73 the Court’s decision is 
nonetheless important in illustrating the Court’s initial nuanced attitude 
towards the interpretation of the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration 
agreements.  In reaching its decision, the Court found it necessary to 
consider the relative effectiveness of the arbitral forum in vindicating the 
plaintiff’s statutory rights. Instead of merely relying on the Securities Act’s 
prohibition of “waiver of judicial trial and review” as grounds for denying 
the stay, it went further to assess the relative disadvantage of arbitration as a 
forum for vindicating the protections afforded to the plaintiff by the 
Securities Act.  
Three years after Wilko, the Court reaffirmed its critique of arbitration.74  
In deciding on the reach of the FAA,75 the Court noted that “[t]he change 
from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in 
ultimate results.”76  This was because in the Court’s view, “[a]rbitration 
carries no right to trial by jury. . . .  [a]rbirators do not have the benefit of 
judicial instruction on the law . . . . need not give their reasons for their 
results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court 

71.  Id. at 436. It should be noted that in a strong dissent, Justice Frankfurter, in a decision that 
presages the future attitude of the court, stated that “[t]here is nothing in the record before us, nor in 
the facts of which we can take judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system . . .  would not 
afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is entitled.” Id. at 439. 
72.  Id. at 438. 
73. Id. at 437. 
74.  Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956). 
75.  The Court held that the provision of § 3 of the United States Arbitration Act for stay of 
the trial of an action until arbitration does not apply to all arbitration agreements, but only to those 
covered by §§ 1 and 2 of the Act (specifically, those relating to maritime transactions and those 
involving interstate or foreign commerce). 
76.  Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of American, 350 U.S. at 203. 
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trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of 
a trial . . . “77 
The point here is not that the Court’s critique of the arbitration process 
in these cases was necessarily compelling,78 but that these cases illustrate a 
period when the Court had a healthy skepticism for the use of arbitration and 
felt the need, in deciding the reach of the FAA, to balance its pro-arbitration 
mandate against competing policy considerations.  
Some of the Court’s subsequent decisions on arbitration continued to 
take into account the effectiveness of the arbitral forum in redressing the 
rights of claimants, especially individuals. For example, in Alexander v. 
Gardner-Denver Co.,79 the Court balanced the public policy underlying Title 
VII against the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes.  In the 
Court’s view, the balancing of the two interests was vital because the policy 
against discrimination was of “the highest priority.”80  In allowing the 
plaintiff who had arbitrated a claim under a collective bargaining agreement 
to litigate a Title VII claim, the Court discussed the limitations of 
vindicating statutory claims in arbitration proceedings.  The Court’s 
discussion of the limitations of arbitration is particularly striking in light of 
its subsequent liberal attitude towards the arbitrability of public law claims 
and its restrictive interpretation of what is required effectively to vindicate 
statutory rights: 
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make 
arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created 
by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the special role of the arbitrator, whose task is 
to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the requirements of enacted 
legislation. . . . But other facts may still render arbitral processes comparatively inferior 
to judicial processes in the protection of Title VII rights. Among these is the fact that the 
specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the 
law of the land. . . . Parties usually choose an arbitrator because they trust his knowledge 
and judgment concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations. On the other 
hand, the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of 
courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to Title VII, 
whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only by reference to public law 
concepts. 

77.  Id. 
78.  See W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 259, 334-54 (1990), for a critique of the use of public policy grounds for striking down 
arbitration agreements. 
79.  415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
80.  Id. at 47. 
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Moreover, the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial 
factfinding. The record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules 
of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as 
discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under  oath, are often 
severely limited or unavailable. . . . And as this Court has recognized, “arbitrators have 
no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award.” . . . Indeed, it is the 
informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, 
and expeditious means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes 
arbitration a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the federal 
courts.81 
The court reached a similar result in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, Inc.,82 where it held that arbitrating a claim under a 
collective bargaining agreement did not preclude an individual from 
bringing a suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act.83 According to the Court, 
an arbitrator whose duty is to effectuate the intent of the parties might issue 
an award that is “inimical to the public policies underlying the FLSA, thus 
depriving an employee of protected statutory rights.”84  Although the Court 
subsequently narrowed its decision in Alexander and Barrentine,85 those 
decisions are nonetheless relevant in illustrating a period in which the Court 
adopted a more nuanced and cautious attitude in analyzing issues relating to 
the scope and enforcement of arbitration agreements. 
This more nuanced attitude towards arbitration was to transmute into an 
unqualified preference for the enforcement of predispute mandatory 
arbitration agreements.  Part of the impetus for this change was the 
recognition that arbitration was one of the vital solutions to the problem of 
congested courts and the overburdened judicial system, a system that Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, in 1976, characterized as in a “near crisis 
situation.”86  Burger stressed the role of arbitration in addressing this 
problem: 

81.  Id. at 56–58. 
82.  450 U.S. 728 (1981). 
83.  Id. at 745. 
84.  Id. at 729. 
85.  See Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009). 
86.  Addresses Delivered At the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction 
with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79, 88 (1976) [hereinafter Addresses Delivered At the 
National Conference] (statement of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger). The conference was named 
“The Pound Conference.” See Hal Neth, The Federal Arbitration Act and How it Grew (May 2011) 
(unpublished Master of Science thesis, University of Oregon), available at 
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As the work of the courts increases, delays and costs will rise and the well-developed 
forms of arbitration should have wider use. Lawyers, judges and social scientists of other 
countries cannot understand our failure to make greater use of the arbitration process to 
settle disputes. I submit a reappraisal of the values of the arbitration process is in order, to 
determine whether, like the Administrative Procedure Act, arbitration can divert litigation 
to other channels.87 
 This call received broad support, including from a member of the 
ABA’s Pound Conference Follow-up Task Force88 who argued that “[a] 
substantial body of experience with compulsory arbitration procedure in 
limited contexts suggests that broader application of this process – perhaps 
to civil claims in broad categories and under certain jurisdictional amounts – 
is warranted.”89  He stated that “[c]ompulsory arbitration has been effective 
in disputes that involve specialized fields of law and a degree of expertise 
not generally possessed by a judge in a court of general jurisdiction.”90  
Further, he suggested that cases involving simple and routine issues may be 
amenable to expedient resolution by arbitration.91  Along the same lines, 
Attorney General Griffin Bell, who was the Chairman of the Pound 
Conference Follow-up Task Force, suggested that “a carefully structured 
arbitration system” would be beneficial “by providing faster and less 
expensive resolution of some actions brought in the federal courts.”92 
 The shift in the Court’s attitude towards the interpretation of the 
FAA began in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp.,93 
where it first articulated the pro-arbitration policy that has since guided its 
decisions.94 There the Court stated that “Section 2 is a congressional 
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding any state substantive law or procedural policies to the 

http://adr.uoregon.edu/files/2012/01/federalarbitrationact.pdf.  Neth has suggested that the 
conference and its aftermath “shed light on the powerful forces that may have shaped the Court’s 
FAA jurisprudence.” Id. 
87.  Addresses Delivered At the National Conference, supra note 86, at 88. See also Neth, 
supra note 86, at 24. 
88.  Colorado Supreme Court Justice William H. Erickson. See 64 A.B.A.J. 47 (1978). 
89.  Id. at 51. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. at 54. 
93.  460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
94.  Id. at 23.  There was, however, earlier indication of judicial willingness to broaden the 
scope of applicability of the FAA. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and 
Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration 
Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 773-75 (2004) (discussing the gradual growth of 
FAA in this period during the 1960s and 1970s). 
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contrary.”95  The Court did not discuss the contours or limits of this pro-
arbitration policy, but this statement has been much cited as justification for 
an expansive reading of the FAA.96  
Moses H. Cone Memorial marked a shift in the Court’s attitude towards 
arbitration and helped establish a liberal attitude towards the arbitrability of 
disputes. According to the Court, “[t]he Arbitration Act establishes that, as 
matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of abatable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself, or an allegation of waiver, delay, 
or a like defense to arbitrability.”97  
The shift in attitude intensified in Southland Corp. v. Keating,98 where 
in a controversial decision, the Court held that § 2 of the FAA was a 
substantive rule under the Commerce Clause, that the Act was binding on 
states, and that it preempted state laws invalidating arbitration agreements.99 
According to the Court, “[i]n enacting § 2 of the Federal Act, Congress 
declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the 
states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the 
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”100  
Moses H. Cone Memorial and Southland were crucial in establishing the 
basic architecture of the modern attitude of the Court towards arbitration. 
Moses H. Cone Memorial established, and Southland reinforced, the view 
that with the FAA, Congress declared a liberal policy favoring arbitration. 
Although neither case articulated the boundaries of this liberal policy, 
subsequent decisions of the Court would use this “policy” as justification for 

95.  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24. 
96.  Id. Commentators have lamented the full import of the pro-arbitration policy articulated 
by the court.. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s 
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and 
Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
97.  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24–25. 
98.  465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
99.  Id. Justice O’Connor, drawing on a careful reading of the legislative history of the Act, 
strongly disagreed with the decision of the majority, noting that “Congress intended to require 
federal, not state, courts to respect arbitration agreements.” Id. at 24. In her view, the decision of the 
majority was “unfaithful to congressional intent, unnecessary, and, in light of the FAA’s antecedents 
… inexplicable.” Id. at 36. She concluded that “[a]lthough arbitration is a worthy alternative to 
litigation, today’s exercise in judicial revisionism goes too far.” Id. at 36. 
100. Id. at 10. 
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severely limiting challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements 
and empowering arbitrators to decide more “gateway” issues of arbitrability. 
Additionally, Moses H. Cone Memorial stated, and Southland amplified, the 
position that § 2 of the Act establishes a rule of substantive law that 
preempted inconsistent state laws limiting the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements. These decisions, and their progeny, have had the radical 
consequence of expanding the reach of the FAA, while practically 
eliminating the ability of states to regulate the availability of arbitration, 
even where regulation is necessary to protect consumers or to enhance the 
vindication of state statutory rights. Few of the proponents of the Act could 
have foreseen the radical consequences it has had on access to justice in the 
United States. As Justice Stevens aptly observed, “[t]here is little doubt that 
the Court’s interpretation of the [FAA] has given it a scope far beyond the 
expectations of the Congress that enacted it.”101 
In the next section, we examine how the effective-vindication doctrine 
emerged in the context of the Court’s enlargement of the arbitrability of 
statutory claims and how the doctrine continued to evolve until the Amex 
decision severely restricted its ambit.  
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EFFECTIVE-VINDICATION DOCTRINE 
A. Mitsubishi and the Origin of the Doctrine 
With the Court’s broadening of the scope of arbitrable matters and the 
transfer of many gateway issues to arbitrators, it was only a matter of time 
before the Court would reverse its view that arbitration was an inappropriate 
forum for resolving federal statutory claims.  The Court in Wilko first 
cogently articulated its case against the arbitrability of federal statutory 
claims..102 As indicated above, Wilko dealt with the arbitrability of a dispute 
under the Securities Act, an Act that contained an anti-waiver provision.103 
In that case, the Court expressed the view that “the intention of Congress 
concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such 
an agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the [Securities] Act.”104  
Lower courts read the decision broadly, with several of them relying on it to 
support the denial of motions to compel arbitration of disputes under the 

101. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001). 
102. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
103. 9 U.S.C. § 14. 
104. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. 
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Sherman Act.105  This was despite the fact that the Sherman Act, unlike the 
Securities Act, does not contain an anti-waiver provision. For example, in 
American Safety Equipment Corporation v. Maguire & Co.,106 the Second 
Circuit relied on Wilko in reaching the conclusion that “the antitrust claims 
raised [in the suit] were inappropriate for arbitration.”107  In reaching this 
decision, the Court was swayed by the public interest embodied in the 
Sherman Act to promote a competitive economy.108 As the Court began to 
articulate the view that the FAA embodied a liberal pro-arbitration policy 
and as it continued to transfer the decision of more gateway issues to 
arbitrators, it became necessary for the Court to reconcile its emerging view 
of congressional, liberal pro-arbitration intent under the FAA with its 
reluctance to permit the arbitration of federal statutory rights.109 
The Court was squarely faced with this issue in Mitsubishi.110 The Court 
had to decide whether to enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust disputes 
by arbitration in an international transaction.111  An allied issue before the 
Court was whether the choice of a foreign governing law affected the 
enforceability of such an agreement.112  The Court held that the parties’ 
arbitration agreement was broad enough to encompass the arbitration of 
antitrust disputes, and found “no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying 

105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. 
106. Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). 
107. Id. at 825. Overruled, by Rodriguez de Quinjas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. 490 U.S. 
477 (1989). 
108.  According to the Court: 
A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is 
designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff 
asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who 
protects the public’s interest. Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of thousands–
perhaps millions–of people and inflict staggering economic damage. 
Id. at 826. 
109. As David Horton has noted, the reluctance to permit the enforcement of statutory claims 
“created confusion about the relationship between the non-arbitrability rule that courts had created 
and congressional intent” because “it was hard to square the reflexive non-arbitrability rule that 
courts had created with the fact that the FAA’s text does not categorically exempt federal statutory 
claims.” David Horton, Arbitration and Inalienability: A Critique of the Vindication of Rights 
Doctrine, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 723, 732 (2012). 
110. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U. S. 614 (1985). 
111. Id. at 624. 
112. Id. at 637. 
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in every contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory 
claims.”113  
In contrast to its earlier views, the Court stated that arbitration was not 
an inferior forum for resolving claims relating to statutory rights.  According 
to the Court, a party who agrees to arbitrate a statutory claim “does not forgo 
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”114 In so doing, the 
party “trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for 
the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”115  Further, in the 
Court’s opinion, neither the text nor the legislative history of the FAA 
evinced a Congressional intent to preclude the waiver of the right to a 
judicial forum.116  A party who contracts to arbitrate should be held to that 
promise “unless Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a 
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.”117 
An important aspect of the Court’s decision in Mitsubishi was the 
availability of the arbitral forum to vindicate the statutory claims in question.  
Having found that there was “no reason to assume at the outset of the 
dispute that international arbitration will not provide an adequate 
mechanism” for resolving the statutory claim,118 the Court stated an 
important caveat. It indicated that the FAA “will continue to serve both its 
remedial and deterrent function” only “so long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate its statutory claim.”119 In this sense, arbitration is a 
suitable forum for resolving claims involving statutory rights so long as the 
arbitral process does not prevent a party from vindicating its federal 
statutory rights.  To buttress the importance of a claimant having the 
opportunity to vindicate statutory claims, the Court noted that “in the event 
the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a 
prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies . . . we 
would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public 
policy.”120 By permitting the arbitration of the federal statutory claim while 
introducing the important caveat that there is still an opportunity to vindicate 

113. Id. at 625. 
114. Id. at 628. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 636. 
119. Id. at 637. 
120. Id. at 637 n.19. 
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statutory rights, the Court reconciled the pro-arbitration policy it found in 
the FAA with the interest in ensuring the vindication of statutory rights.  
The Court’s caution that the FAA would require the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement involving statutory claims so long as “the prospective 
litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory claim” marked the origin of 
the effective-vindication doctrine. Although the Court’s statement was made 
in the context of a discussion of the need for the arbitrators to apply 
mandatory U.S. statutory law despite the party’s choice of a foreign 
governing law, the principle it enunciated was not limited to the application 
of mandatory rules. Further, there is little sound reason, as we shall see, for 
so limiting the principle.  
In fact, a review of the first sentence of the paragraph of the judgment 
that deals with the effective-vindication issue121 indicates that the Court’s 
primary concern was whether arbitration provided an “adequate mechanism” 
for resolving the dispute involving a statutory claim.  In the Court’s view, 
arbitration was “an adequate mechanism” because it allowed the prospective 
claimant the opportunity to vindicate its rights. Central to the Court’s finding 
that the antitrust dispute was arbitrable was its statement that in agreeing to 
arbitrate a dispute, a prospective litigant “does not forgo the substantive 
rights afforded by [a] statute.”122  As the Court stressed, the prospective 
litigant merely “trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the 
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration.”123 
Consequently, the prospective litigant does not bargain away the right to the 
effective vindication of its statutory rights, but merely chooses what would 
usually be a relatively simple, informal, and expeditious forum for 
vindicating those claims.  The principle in Mitsubishi then appears to be that 
the FAA permits the arbitrability of federal statutory claims in so far as the 
particular arbitration does not prevent a party from vindicating statutory 
rights.  Nonetheless, the ambit of the effective-vindication doctrine remained 
unclear, even as subsequent decisions of the Court reaffirmed its importance. 
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.124 the Court compelled the 
arbitration of a dispute alleging wrongful firing under the Age 

121. Id. at 636. 
122. Id. at 628 
123. Id. 
124. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),125 even though it 
acknowledged that the ADEA furthered important social policies.126  The 
Court held that the ADEA did not preclude the arbitration of claims arising 
from the statute and rejected arguments about the unsuitability of arbitration 
for resolving statutory disputes.127  In the Court’s view, there was no 
inherent inconsistency in enforcing a predispute arbitration agreement and 
advancing the vital social policies embodied in the ADEA: 
We do not perceive any inherent inconsistency between those policies, however, and 
enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. It is true that arbitration 
focuses on specific disputes between the parties involved.  The same can be said, 
however, of judicial resolution of claims. Both of these dispute resolution mechanisms 
nevertheless also can further broader social purposes. The Sherman Act, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed to advance 
important public policies, but [we have held that] claims under those statutes are 
appropriate for arbitration. “[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate 
[his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to 
serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”128 
Here again, the opportunity for the prospective litigant to effectively 
vindicate its statutory claims was crucial to the Court’s holding that the 
statutory claim was arbitrable. The social policies embodied in a federal 
statue would not preclude the arbitrability of claims arising from the statute 
in so far as the arbitral forum permitted the vindication of the statutory right. 
The Court reaffirmed this approach in Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V 
Sky Reefer,129 a case involving a motion to stay judicial proceedings and to 
compel arbitration in Tokyo under a clause in a bill of lading.  The petitioner 
resisted the motion on the grounds, inter alia, that the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea Act (COGSA) stipulated that the terms of a contract of carriage could 
not relieve a carrier from obligations or diminish the carrier’s legal duties 

125. 29 U.S.C.S. § 621 et seq. 
126. Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20, 124 at 27. 
127. Id. at 29–30. According to the Court, its recent decisions “have already rejected most of 
these arguments as insufficient to preclude arbitration of statutory claims.” It noted that the 
“generalized attacks on arbitration rest on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the 
protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants,’ and as such, they are ‘far out 
of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving 
disputes.’” Id. at 30. 
128. Id. at 27–28, (citing Mitsubishi). The Court reaffirmed this approach in 14 Penn Plaza 
LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273–74 (2009), (holding that the arbitration of a claim under the ADEA 
may not prevent a claimant “from effectively vindicating” their “federal statutory rights in the 
arbitral forum.”) 
129. Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995). 
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under the COGSA.130 The petitioner expressed fear that the arbitrators may 
not apply the COGSA to the dispute.131 The Court held that the dispute was 
arbitrable, and noted that compelling the parties to arbitrate did not relieve 
the respondent from their obligations under the COGSA.  Crucially, the 
court reaffirmed that it would have had “little hesitation in condemning the 
agreement as against public policy,” if it had been “persuaded that ‘the 
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in -tandem as a 
prospective waiver”’ of the petitioner’s statutory claims.”132  
The Court was soon to be presented with the first opportunity to 
consider the applicability of the effective-vindication doctrine where 
arbitration expenses were alleged to prevent a party from vindicating its 
claims in an arbitration proceeding. In Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama 
v. Randolph (Green Tree),133 the respondent had financed the purchase of a 
home through the petitioner financial corporation.  When the respondent 
sued for violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),134 the petitioner 
moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration.  The district court 
granted the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the 
arbitration clause was unenforceable as the potential high costs of arbitration 
failed to provide the minimum guarantees required to ensure that 
respondents could vindicate their statutory rights.135 According to the Court 
of Appeal, “forcing a plaintiff to bear the brunt of ‘hefty’ arbitration costs 
and ‘steep filing fees’ constitutes ‘a legitimate basis for a conclusion that the 
[arbitration] clause does not comport with [FAA’s] statutory policy.’”136  On 

130. Section 3(8) provided as follows: 
  Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the 
ship from liability for loss or damage to or in connection with the goods, arising from 
negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and obligations provided in this section, or 
lessening such liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and void 
and of no effect. 
46 U.S.C. App. § 1303(8). 
131. Vimar, supra note 129 at 540. 
132. Id. at 540, (citing Mitsubishi). 
133. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
134. 15 U.S.C.S. § 1601. 
135. Randolph v. Green Tree Financial Corp. – Alabama, 178 F.3d 1149 (1999), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
136. Id. at 1157 (citing its decision in Paladino v. Avnet Computer Technologies, Inc., 134 
F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.1998)).  
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appeal, the Court reversed, noting that the record before the court did not 
contain sufficient information about the potential costs of arbitration to the 
respondent. In the Court’s view, the risk that the prohibitive costs of 
arbitration would prevent the respondent from vindicating her rights was too 
speculative to justify invaliding the arbitration agreement.137  According to 
the Court, “[i]t may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could 
preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her federal 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum. But the record does not show that 
Randolph will bear such costs if she goes to arbitration.”138  
Instructively, the Court noted that the burden was on the party resisting 
the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the grounds that the 
proceedings would be prohibitively expensive to demonstrate the likelihood 
of incurring such costs.139 It was because the respondent did not discharge 
this burden that the Court held that the Court of Appeals “erred in deciding 
that the arbitration agreement’s silence with respect to costs and fees 
rendered it unenforceable.”140 
Green Tree represents an important phase in the evolution of the 
effective-vindication doctrine because it marked the first time the Court 
recognized the applicability of the doctrine to issues relating to the costs of 
accessing the arbitral forum. While it acknowledged that the cost of access, 
“large arbitration costs,” may preclude a party from effectively vindicating 
its rights, the record in the instant case was insufficient to establish those 
costs. 
In light of the Court’s subsequent restrictive reading of the effective-
vindication doctrine in American Express,141 it is noteworthy that in its 
decision in Green Tree the Court had no hesitation in accepting that the 
doctrine would be applicable where the costs associated with arbitrating a 
statutory claim prevent a party from vindicating statutory rights.  Green Tree 
could have interpreted Mitsubishi narrowly as concerned solely with the 
willingness and ability of arbitrators to apply the full strength of mandatory 
statutory law. However, by broadly interpreting the principle enunciated by 
Mitsubishi to include access issues, the Court implicitly recognized that the 
policy considerations underlying the effective-vindication doctrine ranged 

137. Green Tree, supra note 133 at 91. 
138. Id. at 90. 
139. Id. at 92. 
140. Id. 
141. Discussed in Part III(b), infra. 
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farther than the interest in ensuring that arbitrators enforce mandatory laws. 
It is to these policy considerations that we now turn. 
B. Policy Considerations Informing the Doctrine 
At a fundamental level, the effective-vindication doctrine represents an 
attempt to balance the pro-arbitration policy embodied in the FAA with the 
public interest in vindicating the statutory rights granted by other federal 
statutes.  While the FAA reflects a policy of enforcing arbitration 
agreements as other contractual obligations,142 that policy often comes into 
conflict with the need to enforce statutory rights in cases where compelling 
the parties to arbitrate in a private forum may inhibit the vindication of their 
federal statutory rights.  In Mitsubishi, the Court recognized that the pro-
arbitration policy of the FAA does not trump the public interest in 
vindicating these statutory rights.143  
It would be recalled that the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA was 
informed by the recognition that the bases for the traditional judicial hostility 
to arbitration were no longer justifiable. Of particular importance in 
dissolving this attitude of hostility was the recognition of the benefits of 
arbitration both in providing a flexible and often expeditious forum for 
resolving private disputes and in decongesting the courts.144 With time, a 
more congenial judicial attitude emerged that respected the autonomy of 
parties to elect to resolve an increasing array of disputes by private 
arbitration.  As the Supreme Court broadened its conception of the mandate 
of the FAA, courts began to interpret the Act as permitting the arbitration of 
an increasing array of statutory claims.  This broadening of the scope of 
arbitrable publiclaw claims necessitated the articulation of a limiting 
principle to ensure that the statutory rights of claimants are appropriately 
vindicated in the arbitral forum. The effective-vindication doctrine has 
served as this limiting principle.  
In allowing the arbitration of federal statutory claims, the courts 
necessarily assume that arbitration adequately protects claimants’ ability to 

142. See Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2309. 
143. See text accompanying note 119, supra. 
144. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 at 628 (noting that parties choose to arbitrate their disputes 
principally to “trade[] . . . the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the 
simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration”). 
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resolve their statutory claims. 145  In fact, in finding that statutory claims are 
arbitrable unless Congress otherwise indicates, courts have frequently 
expressed the assumption that these claims are as vindicable in arbitral 
forums as they are in judicial ones.146 However, this assumption of the 
appropriateness of arbitration for resolving statutory claims “falls apart . . . if 
the terms of an arbitration agreement actually prevent an individual from 
effectively vindicating his or her statutory rights.”147 Consequently, the 
effective-vindication doctrine operates as a necessary support for the 
receptiveness of arbitration as a suitable forum for resolving statutory 
claims. The doctrine does this by compelling the refusal to enforce an 
arbitration agreement where costs or terms of the arbitration agreement 
“would render arbitration an inaccessible or inadequate forum for the 
adjudication of federal right.”148 
In addition, the effective-vindication doctrine is vital in securing the 
deterrence function of federal command statutes.149  Deterrence is often an 
important goal of command statutes.  Central to “most command statutes is a 
deterrence goal. Congress wishes to stop particular conduct either because 
the conduct itself directly causes harm, or because secondary consequences 
of the conduct cause harm.”150  Most federal statutory claims are based on 
statues that have important deterrence goals.151 This deterrence function of 
command statutes is relevant not just to the particular claimant before the 

145. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 658 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
“[t]he arbitration of statutory claims must be accessible to potential litigants as well as adequate to 
protect the rights in question so that arbitration, like the judicial resolution of disputes, will ‘further 
broader social purposes’”). 
146. See, e.g., text accompanying note 128, supra. 
147. Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1243 (10th Cir. 1999). 
148. Brief of Amicus Curiae New England Legal Foundation’s in Support of Petitioners, at 8. 
In a similar vein, the court in Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., noted that the arbitrability of 
federal statutory claims “rest on the assumption that the arbitration clause permits relief equivalent to 
court remedies” and that an agreement would not be enforceable if its provisions defeat the remedial 
purposes of the applicable federal statute. 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998). 
149. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 at 637 (noting that "so long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue 
to serve both its remedial and deterrent functions."). 
150. Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private Rights of Action, 
34 VILL. L. REV. 429, 456 (1989). 
151. See Salil K. Mehra, Deterrence: The Private Remedy and International Antitrust Cases, 
40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 275, 278-84 (2002) (arguing that the fundamental purpose of U.S. 
antitrust law, as interpreted by courts, is deterrence). 
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court but also to society generally.152 As a result, the treatment of federal 
statutory claims raises more complex issues than do those involving ordinary 
contractual transactions.153 Unlike in the latter case which implicates private 
interests only, the former requires a careful balancing of the policy by 
favoring the enforcement of private obligations with the vital policy of 
realizing the goals of federal command statutes.  Again, the effective-
vindication doctrine affords a means of balancing these competing policy 
considerations. 
Furthermore, the effective-vindication doctrine facilitates the realization 
of congressional intent in enacting the FAA.  In enacting the FAA, Congress 
intended to enable private parties to resolve their disputes in a private, 
informal, flexible, yet effective forum.154 The FAA was aimed at promoting 
the efficient resolution, not elimination, of claims in a private system of 
dispute resolution.  The doctrine furthers this purpose of the Act “by 
encouraging agreements that will actually result in parties ‘resolving 
disputes’ in arbitration” and by providing “parties an incentive to negotiate 
agreements that allow for arbitration of federal statutory claims, as opposed 
to agreements that foreclose parties’ ability to vindicate federal rights in 
arbitration.”155  Justice Kagan amplified this point in her dissent in American 
Express: 
“[T]he effective-vindication rule furthers the purposes not just of laws like the Sherman 
Act, but of the FAA itself. That statute reflects a federal policy favoring actual arbitration 
– that is arbitration as a streamlined ‘method of resolving disputes,’ not as a foolproof 
way of killing off valid claims. Put otherwise: What the FAA prefers to litigation is 
arbitration, not de facto immunity. The effective vindication-rule furthers the statute’s 

152. Michael A. Scodro,  Deterrence and Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547, 
591 (2005). 
153. See Roger J. Perlstadt, Timing of Institutional Bias Challenges to Arbitration, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1983, 1995 (2002) (noting that “[t]he treatment of statutory rights is different because of the 
public interest in the resolution of disputes over statutory rights–an interest that is separate from 
private parties’ interest in resolving a dispute between themselves.”). 
154. See Mastrobuono v. Sherson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (noting that 
“parties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreement as they see fit.”); Hall Street 
Assoc., LLC. V. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (noting that the FAA enables parties to 
“tailor. . . many features of arbitration by contract, including the way arbitrators are chosen, what 
their qualifications should be, which issues are arbitrable, along with procedure and choice of 
substantive law.”). 
155. Respondent’s Brief at 41. 
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goals by ensuring that arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute resolution. 
“156 
 In this sense, the doctrine fosters the use of arbitration as an effective 
method of resolving disputes.157 The limitation that the doctrine places on 
the arbitrability of federal statutory claims has contributed to the evolution 
of more “consumer –friendly” clauses in arbitration agreements, designed to 
reduce some of the problems of access in arbitrations.158 These clauses 
enhance access to arbitration through the use of mechanisms like fee–
shifting, cost–shifting, and cost–sharing arrangements. 
Against the background of the foregoing policy considerations 
informing the doctrine, we shall now briefly examine how courts applied the 
doctrine in different contexts. The discussion focuses on its application in 
three important respects: its application to expenses associated with 
arbitration, its application to structural bias in arbitration, and its application 
to class action waivers. This discussion provides a useful context for 
understanding the radical nature of the Court’s decision in American Express 
and for exploring the broader consequences of the case on the evolution of 
American arbitration law. 
 
C. Judicial Refinement of the Doctrine 
1. Expenses Associated with Arbitration 
Expenses associated with arbitration affect the ability of a claimant to 
use arbitration as a method of resolving disputes.  These expenses include 
those obtainable in litigation, such as attorneys’ fees, and those peculiar to 
arbitration, such as arbitrators and administrative fees.  Of particular concern 
with respect to the vindication of statutory rights is whether the fees and 
expenses peculiar to the system of arbitration chosen by the parties preclude 
the prospective claimant from vindicating his or her statutory rights in the 
arbitral forum.  Important in this regard are not just the expenses associated 

156. Amex, 133 S. Ct. 2304 at 2315. 
157. Id. (Kagan notes that the doctrine encourages companies “to adopt arbitral procedures that 
facilitate efficient and accurate handling of complaints.”) 
158. See Myriam Gilles, Killing Them With Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” 
Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 829 (2012) 
(arguing that the doctrine the doctrine has encouraged businesses to implement “bilateral arbitration 
agreements that appear designed to give judges comfort that the claimant will be able to vindicate its 
rights, thereby enabling courts to enforce those agreements…”). 
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with arbitration, but also how those expenses are allocated between the 
parties.  For example, clauses such as cost-splitting159 and loser–pays 
clauses160 may make it relatively more expensive for a prospective claimant 
to arbitrate a statutory dispute than to litigate it.  The cost-differential 
between arbitration and litigation may be so wide and the financial burden of 
arbitration so heavy as to preclude a prospective claimant from vindicating 
her claim in an arbitral forum.  Courts have struggled with how to determine 
when the relative costs of arbitration as compared to litigation would justify 
refusal to enforce an arbitration agreement under the effective-vindication 
doctrine.  
Prior to the Court’s decision in Green Tree,161 some courts adopted a per 
se approach in analyzing the effect of some cost provisions of arbitration 
agreements on the ability of prospective claimants to vindicate their 
statutory rights. In Cole v. Burns,162 for example, the D.C. Circuit applied a 
per se rule in analyzing a fee –splitting agreement.163 The court reasoned that 
a party should not be required to pay the fees of an arbitrator as a condition 
for bringing a statutory claim under Title VII, especially in light of the fact 
that a party “would never be required to pay for a judge in court.”164  
According to the court, in permitting the arbitration of federal statutory 
claims, the Gilmer Court assumed that arbitration would be a reasonable 
substitute for litigation;165 an assumption that would be undermined where a 
claimant is saddled with the burden of paying arbitrators’ fees, a burden that 
is nonexistent in the litigation context. Additionally, the court argued that 
requiring a claimant to share in the cost of the arbitrators’ fees would deter 
prospective claimants from bringing claims to enforce their statutory 
rights.166  The court concluded that a claimant “could not be required to 
arbitrate his public law claim . . . if the arbitration agreement required him to 

159. Cost-splitting clauses require the parties to share the cost of the arbitration proceedings. 
160. In contrast to cost-splitting agreements, loser-pays clauses require the losing party to pay 
the cost of the arbitration proceedings. 
161. Green Tree, supra note 133. 
162. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
163. The court interpreted the arbitration clause in issue as not requiring the claimant to pay 
any arbitration fees and held that the clause, as interpreted, was enforceable. 
164. Id. at 1468, 1484. 
165. Gilmer, supra note 124. 
166. Cole, supra note 162, at 1468. 
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pay all or part of the arbitrator’s fees and expenses.”167  In Paladino v. Avnet 
Computer Techs., Inc.,168 the Eleventh Circuit, citing Cole, stated that 
requiring a claimant to pay part of the hefty cost of arbitration was “a 
legitimate basis for a conclusion that the clause does not comport with 
statutory policy.”169  
The approach in Cole was arguably inconsistent with the language and 
spirit of both Mitsubishi and Gilmer in that it shifted the focus from an 
evaluation of the effect of the arbitration agreement on the vindication of 
federal statutory rights to an evaluation of the equivalence between the costs 
of arbitration and litigation. The Supreme Court decisions called for the 
refusal to enforce only those arbitration agreements that have the practical 
effect of preventing prospective claimants from vindicating their statutory 
claims.  This required not merely a tabulation of the relative costs of both 
processes, but an examination of whether the cost and other differentials 
between the two processes practically inhibited the vindication of federal 
statutory claims.  
In its decision in Green Tree,170 the Court shed some light on the nature 
of the analysis required in effective-vindication cases. Green Tree 
recognized that “large arbitration costs” may prevent a party from 
vindicating her statutory claims.171 However, it placed the burden on the 
claimant to establish that the costs of arbitration would be prohibitively 
expensive.172  The Court implicitly disapproved the per se approach.  In 
rejecting the claimant’s effective-vindication defense, the Court focused on 
the claimant’s inability to show that she was likely to incur prohibitive 
costs.173 In the Court’s view, the mere “risk” that the claimant would be 
“saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation 
of an arbitration agreement.”174  After Green Tree, lower courts had to 
rethink their approach towards analyzing the effects of arbitration expenses 
on the enforceability of arbitration agreements.175 Although Green Tree 

167. Id. at 1485. 
168. Paladino, supra note 136. 
169. Id. at 1062. 
170. Green Tree, supra note 133. 
171. Id. at 90. 
172. Id. at 91. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. However, even subsequent to Green Tree, one circuit has held that fee – splitting 
agreements are per se unenforceable. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 
32
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss3/4
5$!0;>/=A?.<:;>6 
			

>:A
marked a movement away from the per se approach, there remained the 
issue whether courts should focus on the effect of arbitration costs on the 
particular claimant or whether the focus should also include the deterrence 
effect of arbitration costs on a class of prospective claimants.  Two divergent 
approaches emerged in the circuits. 
In Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems,176 the Fourth Circuit 
established an individualized approach that a majority of the circuits 
follow.177 In Bradford, the claimant argued that the fee–splitting provisions 
in an arbitration agreement rendered the agreement unenforceable as a 
matter of law because, in his view, requiring claimants to pay all or part of 
arbitration costs would deter them from enforcing their statutory rights.  He 
suggested that this would undermine the remedial and deterrent purposes of 
the federal statute.178 The claimant encouraged the court to adopt a per se 
rule that would make unenforceable all arbitration agreements with fee–
splitting provisions “irrespective of actual individual deterrence, based upon 
the overall deterrent effect of such provisions.”179 
The court rejected the per se approach.  Although it acknowledged that 
fee–splitting provisions of an arbitration agreement would make the 
agreement unenforceable if they impose arbitration fees and costs that are so 
prohibitive as to effectively deny a claimant access to the arbitral forum,180 
the court felt that Green Tree compelled a case–by–case analysis of the 
effect of such provisions.181 In the court’s view, the refusal by the Court in 
Green Tree to accept “the speculative risk that a claimant might incur 
prohibitive costs [as grounds for invaliding an arbitration agreement] 

2002). The court, however, did not cite Green Tree in conducting its effective-vindication analysis. 
Id. at 895. 
176. 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001). 
177. See, e.g., Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 711-12 (5th Cir. 2002); 
Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003); Musnick v. King Motor Co. of 
Fort Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2003). 
178. Bradford, supra note 176 at 552. He had alleged his employer had acted in violation of 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.S. § 621. 
179. Id. In the alternative, the claimant argued that, if the court rejected the per se rule, he had 
personally established sufficient personal hardship and financial deterrence for the court to refuse to 
enforce the arbitration agreement. Id. 
180. Id. at 554. 
181. Id. at 557. 
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undermined the rationale” of the per se approach.182 Green Tree required the 
focus to be on the effect of the arbitration agreement on “the individual 
litigant” in contrast to the “per se rule that would nullify or invalidate an 
entire category of arbitration provisions.”183  The central focus, in the court’s 
view, should be on “the particular claimant:” whether she has an adequate 
and effective arbitral forum for vindicating her statutory rights.184 The court 
explained the nature of the required analysis as follows: 
We believe the appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum in a 
particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, i.e., a case-by-case 
analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant’s ability to pay the 
arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost differential between arbitration and litigation 
in court, and whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of 
claims.185 
In finding that arbitration was an appropriate forum for resolving federal 
statutory claims, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of a 
claimant’s ability to vindicate his or her statutory rights in the arbitral forum. 
This ability was necessary in order for applicable federal statutes to “serve 
both [their] remedial and deferent function.”186  Ensuring that a particular 
claimant is able to vindicate her rights in an arbitral forum by not being 
precluded from bringing a claim by the exorbitant cost of arbitration will 
help in realizing the remedial function of the applicable federal statute. 
However, focusing exclusively on the ability of individual claimants to 
vindicate their individual claims in the arbitral forum would not necessarily 
promote the realization of the deterrent function of applicable federal 
statutes. The provisions of an arbitration agreement may well have the 
capacity of deterring a class of prospective claimants from vindicating 
statutory claims without necessarily having that effect in the individual case 
before a court.  For example, the particular claimant may be better resourced 
than the typical claimant. Consequently, a court may concentrate on the 
effect of the arbitration agreement on the claimant before it may decide to 
enforce an arbitration agreement, even though the agreement has the broader 
effect of discouraging other prospective claimants from prosecuting their 
claims.   

182. Id.
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 556. 
185. Id. 
186. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 at 28. 
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The case-by-case approach advocated by Bradford may lead to the 
undermining of the deterrence function of the federal statutes. This approach 
focuses the effective-vindication analysis almost entirely on the ability of 
arbitration to serve the remedial function of federal statutes by not deterring 
the particular claimant before the court, but pays scant attention to the 
deterrence effect of arbitration agreements on prospective claimants that are 
not before the court.  Although the third prong of the Bradford test asks 
“whether that cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of 
claims,”187 the actual analysis conducted by the court focused on the 
deterrent effect of the fee-–splitting provision on the claimant before it.188  
The individualized approach suffers the weakness of ignoring the 
potential “chilling effect” of certain arbitration agreements in deterring 
prospective claimants from vindicating their statutory rights.189 As another 
court has noted, the key “issue is not only whether an individual claimant 
would be precluded from effectively vindicating his or her rights in an 
arbitral forum by the risk of incurring substantial costs, but also whether 
other similarly situated individuals would be deterred by those risks as 
well.”190 
Another problem with the individualized, case-by-case approach 
adopted by Bradford, and one which has led to the reduced viability of 
effective-vindication challenges, is that it requires claimants to prove their 
personal inability to afford the expense of arbitration. This invariably 
necessitates claimants submitting information about their personal finances 
and the projected costs of the arbitration proceedings, a requirement that has 
had the practical consequence of making it exceedingly difficult for 
claimants to prevail in effective-vindication inquiries.  
In Green Tree, the Court made it clear that the mere “risk” that one 
would be “saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the 
invalidation of an arbitration agreement.”191 Although the Court did not 

187. Bradford, supra note 176 at 556. 
188. Id. 558 (noting that “Bradford has failed to demonstrate any inability to pay the arbitration 
fees and cost . . . to support his assertion that the fee-splitting provision deterred him from arbitrating 
his statutory claims.”). 
189. Morison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 661 (6th Cir. 2003), discussed infra at text 
accompanying note 197. 
190. Morison, supra note 188, at 661. 
191. Green Tree, supra note 133, at 91. 
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decide how “detailed the showing of prohibitive expense must be,”192 it was 
adamant that the expenses cannot be merely “speculative.”193 Bradford’s 
three-prong test, when read together with Green Tree’s command that 
projected expenses be more than speculative, makes it an almost 
insurmountable task to establish cost-based effective-vindication challenges.  
First, it is often difficult for claimants to prove, during the pre-
arbitration phase when the court usually entertained these challenges, the 
projected cost of arbitration with the precision required by Green Tree and 
Bradford.  The structure of the arbitration agreement may make this 
projection inherently imprecise, as in cases where the arbitration agreement 
“allows for different arbitration providers, contain[s] ambiguous language as 
to how many arbitrators would hear the case, and contains ambiguity 
involving the possibility of shifting of attorney’s fees.”194  In such cases, the 
claimant may have failed to establish the effective-vindication defense even 
though she potentially faces a huge cost burden.  Second, where claimants 
can only establish a range of possible costs of arbitration because of the 
difficulty of tabulating exact figures during the pre-arbitration phase of the 
hearing, courts often utilize the lower range in finding that the claimant has 
not established the effective-vindication defense.  For example, in Boyd v. 
Town Hayneville,195 the court rejected the defense on the grounds that the 
projected costs were merely “anticipated,” even though the plaintiff had 
shown that the arbitration would cost between $1150 and $6400 and the 
plaintiff and his wife had only about $100 remaining each month after 
meeting their living expenses.  
The Bradford approach compounds the difficulty that prospective 
claimants face in establishing the baseline of arbitration costs against which 
litigations costs can be compared.  If great likelihood of high cost is 
insufficient to sustain a challenge, prospective claimants, “specifically those 
with limited means, are unlikely to gamble their food or housing money on 
the chance of a substantial arbitration award.”196  The result is that such 
prospective claimants will be deterred from vindicating their statutory claim, 
thereby undermining the deterrent effect of the relevant federal statutes. 

192. Id. at 92. 
193. Id. at 91. 
194. Richard A. Bales & Mark B. Gerano, Determining the Proper Standard for Invalidating 
Arbitration Agreements Based on High Prohibitive Costs: A Discussion of the Varying Applications 
of the Case-by-Case Rule, 14 TRANSACTIONS 57, 66 (2012). 
195. 144 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (M.D. Ala. 2001). 
196. Jennifer L. Peresie, Reducing the Presumption of Arbitrability, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 
453, 460 (2004). 
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Morrison v. Circuit City Stores,197 a decision by the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit, has advanced an alternative, more liberal approach in 
determining whether arbitration agreements operate to prevent the 
vindication of federal statutory rights. The Morrison approach broadens the 
focus of effective-vindication analysis from the deterrent effect of arbitration 
provisions on the individual claimant before the court to its effects on a class 
of similarly situated prospective claimants.198 This liberal approach factors 
into the analysis how the arbitration provisions affect the realization of both 
the remedial function199 and the deterrence function200 of federal statutes. 
The plaintiff in Morrison, Lillian Morrison, had signed an arbitration 
agreement requiring the arbitration of all disputes arising from her 
employment with Circuit City, including all state and federal statutory 
claims.201 The arbitration agreement contained a cost-splitting clause under 
which Morrison was to pay a filing fee as well as half of the costs of the 
arbitration, unless the arbitration tribunal decided otherwise.202  When 
Circuit City terminated her employment, she filed a suit alleging race and 
sex discrimination.203  The district court granted Circuit City’s motion to 
compel arbitration.204  On appeal, Morrison argued that the cost-splitting 
provision of the arbitration agreement prevented her from effectively 
vindicating her statutory rights.205 
In its decision, the Sixth Circuit discussed the implication of both 
Gilmer and Green Tree on the conduct of effective-vindication analysis.  
The court felt that by requiring that the arbitral forum is accessible to 
prospective litigants in order “further broader social purposes,” Gilmer 

197. Morrison, supra note 188. 
198. This approach has also been adopted by the Third Circuit. See Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 
324 F.3d 212 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
199. It requires an examination of the issue whether the provisions have the cumulative effect 
of preventing the potential claimant from vindicating her rights. 
200. It requires an examination of the “chilling effect” of the arbitration provisions on a class 
of similarly situated prospective claimants. 
201. Morrison, 317 supra note 188 at 654. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 828-29 (S.D. Ohio 1999). 
205. Morrison, supra note 188, at 657–58. It is instructive to note that because the district 
court’s order to compel arbitration was not stayed when she filed her appeal, the arbitrators had 
already issued their award before the Court of Appeals issued its judgment. Id. at 656. 
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entailed that “employers should not be permitted to draft arbitration 
agreements that deter a substantial number of potential litigants from” 
vindicating their statutory rights.206  Although the court acknowledged that 
Green Tree required a case-by-case approach in conducting effective-
vindication analysis,207 it rejected the individualized case-by-case approach 
adopted in Bradford.  It gave two compelling reasons why the Bradford 
approach was inadvisable: the difficulty of establishing baseline arbitration 
costs in the manner required under the Bradford test and the fact that the 
individualized approach does not factor in the “chilling effect” some 
arbitration agreements have in “deterring a substantial number of potential 
litigants from seeking to vindicate their statutory rights.”208  In place of the 
individualized approach, the court adopted what it called a “revised case-by-
case approach.”209  Under this approach, a court conducting an effective-
vindication analysis would consider whether the arbitration provisions have 
the effect of preventing the prospective claimant before the court and other 
similarly situated individuals from vindicating their statutory rights.210   
The Morrison approach is more liberal than the Bradford approach for a 
variety of reasons.  It enlarges the focus of the effective-vindicating analysis 
by factoring in the potential “chilling effect” of the arbitration provisions on 
similarly situated parties.  This enlargement of focus is informed by the need 
to advance both the remedial and the deterrent functions of federal command 
statutes.211  The former function is realized by enabling a particular claimant 
to vindicate his or her statutory rights.  The latter function, which implicates 
“broader social functions,” is advanced by ensuring that the subjects of 
statutory obligations do not evade those obligations by immunizing 
themselves from liability through the use of carefully worded arbitration 

206. Id. at 658. It added that allowing employers to deter a substantial number of potential 
litigants would undermine the social goals of the federal statutes and enable employers to evade the 
requirements of those statutes. Id. 
207. Id. at 659. 
208. Id. at 660–61. 
209. Id. at 663. 
210. Id.  According to the court, potential litigants should be allowed “to demonstrate that the 
potential costs of arbitration are great enough to deter them and similarly situated individuals from 
seeking to vindicate their federal rights in the arbitral forum.” (emphasis added) Id. The court’s use 
of the conjunctive is unfortunate, because while the realization of the deterrence function of federal 
statutes may require a focus on the effect of arbitration provisions on similarly situated prospective 
claimants, the realization of the remedial function of these statutes would require a successful 
effective-vindication challenge where the provisions of the arbitration agreement in question has the 
effect of deterring the particular claimant from vindicating his or her statutory rights. 
211. Id. at 663. 
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agreements that practically preclude access to the arbitral forum.  In the 
court’s view, it is the “presence [of potential litigants] in the system and 
their ability to vindicate their statutory rights that would help realize the 
deterrent function of federal statutory rights.”212 
Furthermore, the Morrison approach adopts a more relaxed approach in 
establishing baseline arbitration costs.  Unlike the Bradford approach, under 
which individual claimants have the burden of establishing their potential 
arbitration costs with a high degree of definiteness, the Morrison approach 
allows the court to “look to average or typical arbitration costs, because that 
is the kind of information that potential litigants will take into account in 
deciding whether to bring their claims in the arbitral forum.”213  
Additionally, in determining the baseline costs of arbitration, the Morrison 
approach does not factor in the possible effect of cost-shifting provisions in 
eventually reducing the expenses of the claimant.214  Because the Morrison 
effective-vindication analysis focuses on the effect of the arbitration 
agreement on similarly situated claimants, the possibility that the operation 
of the cost-shifting clause may reduce expenses of an individual claimant is 
less relevant.  After all, the arbitration agreement may still have the overall 
effect of deterring similarly situated claimants from vindicating their 
legitimate statutory grievances despite having that practical consequence of 
reducing the expenses of a particular claimant in the particular instance.215 
Although the Morrison approach is consistent with the goal of realizing 
the remedial and deterrence function of federal statutes, there remains some 
tension between this approach and the tenor of Court’s decision in Green 
Tree.216  In Green Tree, the Court focused on whether the costs of arbitration 
“could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from effectively vindicating her 
statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”217  The Court felt that she had failed to 
establish the effective-vindication defense because “the record [did not] 

212. Id. 
213. Id. at 664. 
214. Id. at 664–65. 
215. Id. The court observed that “[i]n many cases, if not most, employees considering the 
consequences of bringing their claims in the arbitral forum will be inclined to err on the side of 
caution, especially when the worst-case scenario would mean not only losing on their substantive 
claims but also the imposition of the costs of arbitration.” Id. 
216. Green Tree, supra note 161. 
217. Id. at 522. 
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show that Randolph will bear [large arbitration] costs if she goes to 
arbitration.”218  The Court concluded that a party raising the effective-
vindication challenge bears the burden of establishing the likelihood of 
incurring large arbitration costs.219  The Court’s language strongly suggests 
that the case-by-case analysis should focus on the effect of arbitration 
provision on individual claimants, as the Bradford approach requires.  
However, narrowing the focus of the analysis in the manner suggested by 
Bradford undermines one of the foundational bases for the Court’s finding 
that federal statutory claims were arbitrable: the assumption that the arbitral 
forum, similar to the judicial forum, would advance the realization of the 
dual functions of federal command statutes.220  
In Gilmer, the Court shed some light on the considerations that support 
the arbitration of federal statutory claims: 
[T]he ADEA is designed not only to address individual grievances, but also to further 
important social policies. We do not perceive any inherent inconsistency between those 
policies, however, and enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. It is 
true that arbitration focuses on specific disputes between the parties involved.  The same 
can be said, however, of judicial resolution of claims. Both of these dispute resolution 
mechanisms nevertheless also can further broader social purposes. The Sherman Act, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed 
to advance important public policies, but . . . claims under those statutes are appropriate 
for arbitration. “[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its 
remedial and deterrent function.”221  
Here the court recognizes that federal statutory claims advance 
“important public policies” separate from the “individual grievances” of 
particular claimants.  Nonetheless, the court finds that these claims are 
arbitrable, and that the statute will continue to perform its dual functions, so 
long as claimants are able to vindicate their rights.  However, individualized 
effective-vindication analysis, advocated by Bradford, would advance 
redressing of “individual grievances” without necessarily furthering the 
realization of the “important social goals” that the Gilmer Court recognized 
are embodied in federal statutes.  If arbitration frustrates the realization of 
these “important social goals,” it cannot be said to “further broader social 

218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. See Mitsubishi, 473 U. S. at 637 (noting that federal statutes would continue to perform 
their remedial and deterrent function “so long as the prospective litigant may vindicate its statutory 
rights”). 
221. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28 [internal citations omitted]. 
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purposes” in the sense envisaged by the Gilmer Court and used by it in 
support of allowing the arbitration of federal statutory claims.  It would seem 
that the Morrison approach to effective-vindication inquiry accords better 
both with the policy justifications used by the Courts for allowing the 
arbitration of federal statutory claims and with the policy considerations 
underpinning the effective-vindication doctrine. 
In conducting effective-vindication inquiries, it is helpful to have an 
appreciation of the policy consideration underpinning the doctrine.  For 
example, courts have grappled with how to deal with extra-contractual 
promises aimed at reducing a claimant’s arbitration costs when such 
promises are made in an effort to defend an effective-vindication challenge 
to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement.  Courts have adopted 
varying responses to this strategy.222  However, careful consideration of the 
policy underlying the doctrine would suggest that such offers should not be 
decisive in an effective-vindication inquiry.  This is because while such 
extra-contractual promises advance the remedial function of federal statutory 
rights, by reducing the arbitration costs of the particular litigant, the 
arbitration agreements in question may well have the radical consequence of 
undermining the broader deterrence function of applicable federal statutes, 
by having a chilling effect on prospective claimants.  In Morrison, the Sixth 
Circuit held that courts should reject such extra-contractual promises 
because, while they may be helpful in providing access to the individual 
claimant to whom the promise is made, the cost features of the arbitration 
agreement may deter other prospective litigants from vindicating their 
statutory claim.223  As the court aptly noted, the overriding concern in an 
effective-vindication inquiry is whether an arbitration agreement “will deter 
potential litigants from bringing their statutory claims in the arbitral 
forum.”224  
Green Tree and its progeny make clear that the costs associated with 
arbitration may preclude a party from vindicating her statutory rights, even 

222. For a summary of the relevant cases, see Horton, supra note 109, at 741 n.111. 
223. Morrison, supra note 204, at 676–77. 
224. Morrison, supra note 188, at 677. The Sixth Circuit has not consistently applied this 
approach. See, e.g., Mazera v. Varsity Ford Management Service, 565 F.3d 997, 1004–05 (6th Cir. 
2009), where the court found that an arbitration agreement was enforceable despite arbitration in the 
case being “prohibitively expensive” because the defendant had offered to waive some of the fees 
associated with the arbitration. 
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though there is divergence in terms of the focus of the inquiry.  Although the 
Morrison approach appears more consistent with the goal of reconciling the 
FAA with the policies and goals of other federal command statues, the 
Bradford test has been more widely followed.  Whether cost-based 
challenges can be founded on costs other than those of accessing the arbitral 
forum, such as arbitrators and administrative fees, was taken up by the Court 
in American Express.  The Court’s answer to this important question is 
discussed below.225 
2. Structural Bias of Arbitration 
Although Gilmer and its progeny have substantially limited the ability 
of courts to use the procedural inadequacies of arbitration as justification for 
refusing to enforce arbitration agreements, they do not foreclose using the 
structural bias of particular systems of arbitration as the foundation of 
effective-vindication challenges.226  In Gilmer, the Court indicated that the 
allegation of “procedural inadequacies [in an arbitration] is best left for 
resolution in specific cases.”227  This leaves open the possibility that such 
inadequacies may justify refusal to compel arbitration.  In this respect, the 
Seventh Circuit has observed that “Gilmer left open a door for plaintiffs to 
challenge mandatory arbitration of statutory claims by showing that [the] 
arbitration system is structurally biased.”228 
The Sixth Circuit has indicated that the structural bias of a system of 
arbitration would be sufficient to sustain an effective-vindication analysis.  
In Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak House,229 the court hinted that structural 
bias might invalidate an arbitration agreement.  The claimant argued that the 
arbitration rules and procedures available for the arbitration of their Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
claims prevented them from effectively vindicating their statutory rights..  
They argued that the arbitration agreement “allow[ed] for the appointment of 
a biased and incompetent panel of arbitrators, as well as unduly limit[ed] the 
participants’ discovery opportunities.”230  Although the case was decided on 

225. See Part III(b), infra. 
226. See Gilmer, supra note 124 at 30 (noting that claimants had not demonstrated that the 
arbitration regime in the proposed arbitration was inadequate to guard against potential bias). 
227. Id. at 33. 
228. Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 167 F. 3d  361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999). 
229. 211 F. 3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000). 
230. Id. at 311. 
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other grounds, the court was receptive to the idea that structural bias in an 
arbitration framework may prevent claimants from vindicating their 
statutory claims.231  The court observed that, “even if arbitration is generally 
a suitable forum for resolving particular statutory claims, the specific arbitral 
forum provided under an agreement must nevertheless allow for the 
effective vindication of that claim.”232  
Soon after, the Sixth Circuit directly addressed the issue in McMullen v. 
Meijer, Inc.,233,in which  a claimant argued that she should not be compelled 
to arbitrate her Title VII234 claims because the arbitration agreement was 
structurally biased in that it granted her employer exclusive control over the 
pool of potential arbitrators.  The court agreed, holding that the employer’s 
unfettered control over the pool of potential arbitrators prevented the 
claimant from effectively vindicating her statutory rights.235  The court 
reaffirmed this approach in Walker v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc.,236 
in which it held that the structural bias in an arbitration agreement prevented 
claimants from vindicating their rights under the FLSA.237  The court found 
that aspects of the arbitration process biased the process against the 
prospective claimant and in favor of the employer.238  The court noted that 
claimants can raise structural bias allegations as part of pre-arbitration 
challenges because such bias prevents arbitration from being an effective 
substitute for litigation.239 
Recognition that structural bias may ground an effective-vindication 
challenge is certainly consistent with the policy arguments the Supreme 
Court used to justify the arbitrability of statutory claims.  These include the 
assumption that arbitrations are effective substitutes for litigation and that 

231. Id. at 314. The court expressed “serious reservations as to whether the arbitral forum [in 
the case] is suitable for the resolution of statutory claims.” 
232. Id. at 313. 
233. 355 F.3d 485 (6th Cir. 2004). 
234. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
235. McMullen, supra note 232, at 494. However, the court remanded the case to the district 
court for determination whether the arbitrator-selection clause should be severed from the rest of the 
agreement. Id. at 496. 
236. 400 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2005). 
237. 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 201-219. 
238. McMullen, supra note 232, at 385–88. 
239. Id. at 385 (noting that the unfairness of the arbitrator-selection process makes arbitration 
an ineffective substitute for the judicial forum). 
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arbitrations “further broader social purposes” by allowing the realization of 
both the remedial and deterrent function of federal statutes.  Clearly, an 
arbitration framework that is structurally biased against prospective 
claimants is not an ideal substitute for litigation and would frustrate the 
realization of the dual functions of federal command statutes.  Moreover, 
structurally biased arbitration agreements are typically aimed at preventing 
claimants from vindicating their statutory rights by stacking the deck in 
favor of the prospective defendant. 
The structural bias aspect to effective-vindication challenges is 
important for another reason.  The recognition of structural bias as a basis 
for invalidating arbitration agreements derives from a vitally accurate 
insight: the policy considerations supporting the effective-vindication 
doctrine warrant broadening its scope beyond issues relating to the costs of 
accessing the arbitral forum and the application of mandatory federal laws, 
areas in which these challenges have traditionally been used.  It remains to 
be seen how the Court’s recent decision in American Express will affect this 
aspect of effective-vindication challenges. 
We now turn to the applicability of effective-vindication challenges to 
the waiver of class action claims. 
3. Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements 
Class action waivers are increasingly found in arbitration agreements.240 
In the context of arbitrations, these waivers are aimed at barring contracting 
parties from joining or consolidating claims in arbitration and obligating 
them to pursue individual claims in separate arbitration.241 For businesses, 
class action waivers are a means of minimizing exposure to problems they 
associate with aggregation of claims.242  We are here concerned not with the 

240. For a discussion of the evolution of the use of class waivers in arbitration agreements, see 
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-total Demise of the Modern Class 
Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373,  396, et seq. (2005). In her article, she uses the phrase “collective 
action waivers” because these clauses typically “waiver not only the right to participate in class 
actions, but also the right to participate in classwide arbitrations or to aggregate claims with others in 
any form of judicial or arbitral proceeding.” Id. at 376 n.15. 
241. For example, the arbitration agreement between the parties in Stachurski v. DirecTV, Inc., 
the arbitration agreement provided that “[n]either you nor we shall be entitled to join or consolidate 
claims in arbitration by or against other individuals or entities, or arbitrate any claim as a 
representative member of a class or in a private attorney general capacity.” 642 F.Supp. 2d 758, 762 
(N.D. Ohio 2009). 
242. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the 
Class Action Survive? 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (2000). See also Maria Glover, Beyond 
44
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss3/4
5$!0;>/=A?.<:;>6 
			

>;C
merits of the arguments against the use of class actions, but on how class 
action waivers adversely affect the ability of prospective claimants to 
vindicate their statutory rights. Whatever the merits of the case against class 
action measures, it is clear that by restricting claim aggregation, class action 
waivers have the practical consequence of significantly reducing the number 
of potential claims against businesses, especially where the costs and 
expenses associated with arbitration pale in comparison to the potential 
individual recovery.243  The preclusion of the ability to share expenses with 
other claimants in a joint action may prevent prospective claimants from 
vindicating their statutory rights.   
Class actions have been particularly useful in aggregating claims whose 
individual prosecution would be economically unfeasible.244  This role of 
class actions is especially salient in the context of consumer transactions, 
where the recovery for individual injury may be very little even though the 
broader injury to consumers as a group is very great.245  Where potential 

Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
1735, 1745 (2006) (noting that corporations use class action waivers because they view plaintiffs as 
exploiting “the class action procedure in order to wrest large and unfair settlements from 
defendants.”). 
243. As one commentator has aptly noted, businesses are “insulating themselves from liability 
by contractually restricting potential plaintiffs’ use of a powerful and legitimate procedural too in 
arbitration – the class action.” Byron Allyn Rice, Enforceable or Not?: Class Action Waivers in 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses and the Need for a Judicial Stand, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 215, 218 
(2008). This trend has made it more difficult for claimants “to stand up for their rights in the face of 
corporate neglect or wrongdoing.” Benjamin Sachs-Michaels, The Demise of Class Actions Will Not 
be Televised, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 665, 668-69 (2011). 
244. This sentiment was shared by Justice Rehnquist, who observed that “[c]lass actions … 
permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.” Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985).  Instructively, the case in which he made the 
observation involved “claims averaging about $100 per plaintiff,” which meant that “most of the 
plaintiffs would have no realistic day in court if a class action were not available.” Id. In a similar 
vein, the Seventh Circuit has observed that “The policy at the very core of the class action 
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any 
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. Id.  A class action solves this problem 
by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor. Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997), cited with 
approval in Amchen Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997). 
245. David Rosenberg has stressed the role of class actions in ameliorating the “asymmetrical 
litigation power” evident in low stake claims “involving los that is large in the aggregate, but too 
small as incurred by each plaintiff for a competent attorney to consider any single claim 
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individual recoveries by consumers is low and the aggregate monetary 
benefit from violating consumer protection laws is high, a class action 
waiver may enable a corporation to violate consumer protection laws while 
practically immunizing itself from liability. Consequently, a class action 
waiver may operate to undermine both the remedial and the deterrent 
functions of federal consumer laws.  
Despite their limitations, class actions remain a strategy for providing 
redress to consumers and other small players in the economy for grievances 
against larger players.  As Myriam Gilles has noted: 
“. . . class actions – warts and all – do far more good than harm.  I take it as beyond 
dispute that the threat of class action liability plays a vital role in deterring corporate 
wrongdoing.  And while one might argue – as many scholars do – that class action in 
contemporary practice may tend to over deter, or that agency costs hamper the 
effectiveness of class action device, I am aware of no serious argument that we should 
ditch class actions in their entirety. Everyone seems to agree that sound public policy 
requires collective litigation be available for small-claim plaintiffs who would not have 
the incentive or resources to remedy harms or deter wrongdoing in one-on-one 
proceedings.”246 
As the frontier of arbitration continues to expand, the restriction that 
class action waivers put on access to justice comes into sharper focus.  In 
practice, because most class action claims are founded on federal questions, 
they often implicate federal statutory rights in areas such as federal 
consumer law, civil rights, antitrust, and securities law.247  Because most 
statutory claims are now arbitrable,248parties increasingly use arbitration as a 
method of resolving these types of claims. The question necessarily arises 
whether the effective-vindication doctrine may be used to resist the 

economically worth prosecuting.” David Rosenberg, Decoupling Deterrence and Compensation 
Function in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1906 n.62 (2002). 
246. Gilles, supra note 239, at 378 (emphasis in original). While Gilles was discussing the 
importance of class actions in the context of litigation, her arguments are also precisely relevant in 
the context of arbitration. 
247. See Gilles, supra note 246, at 391. The class action procedure is often “uniquely suited” 
for the resolution of certain statutory right. See Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class 
Actions Survive? 37 AKRON  L. REV. 813, 813 (2004) (suggesting the appropriateness of class action 
litigation for the resolution of Title VII cases). 
248. The arbitrability of most federal statutory claims means that “individuals pursuing long-
established statutory claims, such as those brought under the federal securities and antitrust laws, and 
newer but long-sought civil rights claims, including race, sex, age, and disability discrimination, may 
now be forced to arbitrate if the parties are deemed to have assented to a pre-dispute arbitration 
clause.” Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute 
Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 
2004, at 55–56. 
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enforcement of class action waivers in arbitration agreements.  It should be 
noted that the doctrine is irrelevant where a class action waiver operates to 
preclude class arbitration of an entirely contractual dispute that does not 
implicate statutory rights.  In contrast, the doctrine will be relevant where 
the waiver is alleged to have the practical consequences of preventing a 
claimant from vindicating federal statutory rights.249 
The evolution of judicial attitude towards the use of the effective-
vindication doctrine to challenge the enforcement of class action waivers in 
arbitration agreements is best understood in the context of the methods that 
have been used to challenge such waivers.  Unconscionability challenges 
were the first line of defense against enforcing class action waivers in 
arbitrations.250  The following discussion considers the unconscionability 
defense to the enforcement of class action waivers and explains how the 
arguments the Supreme Court used in limiting the availability of that defense 
came to play an important role in narrowing the availability of effective-
vindication challenges. 
Unconscionability is a long-standing defense to the enforcement of 
contractual obligations.  Although the FAA, reflects “a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration,”251 it contains a savings clause permitting the refusal to 
enforce arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in 

249. Effective-vindication challenges to class waivers in arbitration agreements are 
distinguishable from challenges based on the inconsistency of class waivers with the framework of 
particular federal statutes. The Truth in Lending Act, for example, specifically provides for the use 
of class action litigation. TRUTH IN LENDING ACT, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (2000).  Some claimants 
have suggested that class waivers clauses were unenforceable with respect to claims under the statute 
because of inherent conflict between the waiver and the enforcement scheme of the statute.  Most 
circuits have rejected this argument.  For example, the Third Circuit has held that “simply because 
judicial remedies are part of a law does not mean that Congress meant to preclude parties from 
bargaining around their availability.” Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377 (3d Cir. 
2000).  The court held that Truth in Lending Act claims were arbitrable even if class action 
mechanism is unavailable.  The attitude of most courts on this issue is that the mere provision for 
class actions in a statute does not entail that the right is non-waivable. It would seem, therefore, that 
“a congressional enactment will not be found to be facially incompatible with a collective action 
waiver in the absence of a specific statutory antiwaiver provision.”  Myriam Gilles, supra note 239, 
at 405–06. 
250. A commentator has characterized unconscionability challenges to class action waivers as 
the “first-wave challenges” to their enforceability. See Gilles, supra note 246, at 399. The “second-
wave challenges,” on this view, are effective-vindication defenses. Id. at 406. 
251. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
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equity for revocation of any contract.”252  The Supreme Court has interpreted 
the savings clause as allowing the invalidation of arbitration agreements on 
grounds of “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability,” while disallowing their invalidation on grounds of 
defenses that apply only to arbitration.253 
The unconscionability doctrine was the basis for the first wave of 
challenges to the enforceability of class-action waivers in arbitration.254  
California was at the forefront of these challenges.255  The California 
Supreme Court emphasized the vital role of class action remedies in 
consumer transactions and stressed that unconscionability challenges were 
an invaluable method of halting and redressing the exploitation of 
consumers.256 The Court articulated a rule [the Discover Bank rule] for 
determining the enforceability of class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements: 
“[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which 
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, 
and when it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a 
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums 
of money, then . . . the waiver becomes in practice the exemption of the party ‘from 
responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.’  
Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under California law and 
should not be enforced.”257 
 This Discover Bank rule was influential in stimulating the trend of 
unconscionability challenges to class action waivers in arbitration.  Although 
this trend was initially resisted in some states, “by 2011 at least fourteen 
states had ruled class action waivers unenforceable on these broad public 

252. Section 2 of the FAA. 
253. Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Perry v. Thomas, 482 
U.S. 483, 492–93 n.9 (1987). 
254.  See Gilles, supra note 239 at 399-402. 
255. Myriam Gilles, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 632 (2012). 
256. See Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal 2005). The court stressed 
that the importance of the unconscionability defense to the enforcement of class waivers especially 
in light of the fact that in many cases the “damages in consumer cases are often small” and a 
corporation may reap a handsome profit by wrongfully exacting “a dollar from each of millions of 
customers.” Id. 
257. Id. at 1101-1108. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1668). California courts frequently used 
this rule as grounds for invalidating class action waivers. See, e.g., Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 134 Cal. 
App. 4th 544, 556-57 (2005); Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 134 Cal.App. 4th 1283, 1297 
(2005); Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc., 142 Cal. App. 4th 1442, 1451-53 (2006). 
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policy grounds” and the movement was towards the gradual acceptance of 
the unconscionability defense to class action waivers.258  
As this movement gathered momentum, the Supreme Court faced the 
issue of whether the use of the defense to invalidate class action waivers in 
arbitration “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purpose and objectives of [the FAA].”259  AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion,260 presented the Court with the question of “whether § 2 [of the 
FAA] preempts California’s rule classifying most collective-arbitration 
waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable.”261  The case arose from a 
decision of the Ninth Circuit262 affirming a district court decision263 
invalidating a class-action waiver on grounds of unconscionability.  Vincent 
and Liza Concepcion purchased a two-year service contract from AT&T, 
which advertised a free or significant discounted phone in exchange for the 
wireless service contracts.  Although AT&T did not charge the Concepcions 
for the phones, they did charge them with paying a sales tax of $30.22, based 
on the full retail value of the phones. They filed a complaint against AT&T 
alleging that AT&T engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging a 
sales tax despite advertising the phones as free. The complaint was 
subsequently consolidated in a class action against AT&T. AT&T moved to 
compel arbitration, but the district court denied the motion. Although the 
arbitration agreement had some consumer-friendly features, which reduced 
the cost of arbitration for prospective claimants,264 the court felt compelled 
by the Discover Bank rule to invalidate the agreement.  According to the 
court, “[f]aithful adherence to California’s stated policy of favoring class 
litigation and arbitration to deter alleged fraudulent conduct in cases 
involving large numbers of consumers with small amounts of damages, 

258. See Gilles, supra note 239, at 633. (See note 33 for examples of cases holding that class 
action waivers were unconscionable under state law).  
259. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
260. 131 S. Ct. 1744 (2011). 
261. Id. at 1746. 
262. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009). 
263. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103712, 2008 WL 5216255 (S.D. 
Cal. Aug. 11, 2008). 
264. Id. at 36. These features of the clause are summarized in the Supreme Court decision. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
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compels the Court to invalidate AT&T’s class waiver provision.”265 The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, and further held that the 
FAA did not preempt the application of the Discover Bank rule.266 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the FAA 
preempted the Discover Bank rule because it stood “as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of 
Congress.”267 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia indicated that the 
central purpose of the FAA “is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined 
proceedings.”268 He reiterated the view that the FAA reflects “a liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state 
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”269 He opined that the 
savings clause of § 2 of the FAA, which permits the invalidation of 
arbitration agreements “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract,” does not validate state laws aimed specifically 
at limiting the enforceability of arbitration agreements or “that derive their 
means from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”270 Laws and 
policies that discriminate against arbitration, he noted, are not the kind of 
grounds for contract revocation that are a permissible basis for invalidating 
arbitration agreements under § 2.271 The saving clause did not preserve state-
law rules that interfere with the realization of the objectives of the FAA. 272 
By requiring the availability of class wide arbitration, the Discover Bank 
rule interfered with the fundamental attributes of arbitration: “efficient, 
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”273 As a result, the 
rule was inconsistent with the FAA.274 Scalia went on to discuss the ways in 

265. Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., at 42. 
266. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, supra note 261 at 852. 
267. Concepcion,  supra note 260, at 1753 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 
(1941)). 
268. Concepcion, supra note 260 at 1748. 
269. Id. at 1749. 
270. Id. at 1746, citing Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); Perry 
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n. 9 (1987). 
271. Concepcion, supra note 260 at 1746-48. He emphasized that a court, much like a state 
legislature, may not erect impressible barriers to the accomplishments of the objectives of the FAA. 
In this regard, “a court may not ‘rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a 
state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to 
effect what . . . the state legislature cannot.’” Id. at 1747, (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S., at 493). 
272. Concepcion, supra note 260 at 1748. 
273. Id.  at 1749. 
274. Id. at 1748. 
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which class wide arbitrations interfere with the fundamental attributes of 
arbitration: by sacrificing the flexibility of arbitration,275 by fostering 
procedural formality,276 and by increasing the risks to corporate 
defendants.277  In his view, arbitration was ill suited “to the higher stakes of 
class litigation.”278  In response to the claim that “class proceedings are 
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might otherwise slip through 
the legal system,” he indicated that “[s]tates cannot require a procedure that 
is inconsistent with the FAA even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”279 
 It is instructive to note that the central issue in Concepcion, which 
was clearly stated in the majority opinion, was whether the FAA preempted 
the Discover Bank rule.280  The Court focused its analysis on whether the 
rule was valid under the savings clause of § 2. The Court’s decision that the 
FAA preempted the rule was founded on essentially two grounds. The first 
was the view that the savings clause “does not preserve state-law rules that 
stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objective.”281 The 
second was its finding that by “[r]equiring the availability of classwide 
arbitration,” the Discover Bank rule “interfere[d] with the fundamental 
attributes of arbitration,” and was therefore inconsistent with the FAA.282  
Concepcion is then best understood as answering the preemption question, 
which Scalia clearly stated was the one before the Court. 
 As we shall see, the Court’s dismissal of the argument for the use of 
class proceedings in prosecuting small-value claims that may fall through 
the cracks of the legal system was to play an important role in the its 
analysis of the effective-vindication doctrine in American Express.283 What 
is important to appreciate at this juncture is that the Court’s dismissal of that 
argument in Concepcion was perhaps understandable in light of its finding 

275. Id. at 1751. 
276. Id. at 1751–52. 
277. Id. at 1752. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. at 1753. 
280. According to Scalia, “The question in this case is whether § 2 preempts California’s rule 
classifying most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as unconscionable. We refer to 
this rule as the Discover Bank rule.” Id. at 1746. 
281. Id. at 1748. 
282. Id.  
283. See Part III(b), infra. 
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that requiring the availability of classwide arbitration interfered with the 
fundamental attributes of arbitration.284 If that requirement is inconsistent 
with the FAA, a contestable position, then the preemption rule compels the 
invalidation of a state rule enacting that requirement, regardless of the policy 
merits of the requirement.  
 Because Concepcion subsequently played an unexpected role in 
American Express, it is crucial to reiterate what Concepcion did and what it 
did not do.  In examining whether the FAA preempted application of the 
Discover Bank rule, the Court highlighted the various reasons why, in its 
opinion, the requirement of the availability of classwide arbitrations stood in 
opposition to the fundamental attributes of arbitration. In light of the pro-
arbitration policy of the FAA and that Court’s finding that the Discover 
Bank rule interfered with that policy, the Supremacy Clause compelled 
invalidating the rule.  The preemption analysis does not turn on a balancing 
of the competing public policy interests underlying the FAA, a federal law, 
and the Discover Bank rule, a state rule.  Under the Supremacy Clause, the 
inconsistent state law is necessarily displaced. This explains the Court’s 
breezy dismissal of the claim that class proceedings are necessary for the 
prosecution of small-value claims.  As the Court rightly noted, the 
desirability of a state rule enhancing the prosecution of small-value claims 
would not validate the rule if it is inconsistent with a federal statute, in this 
case, the FAA.285 
 The Justices who decided Concepcion was not concerned with the 
effective-vindication doctrine,286 and the majority rightfully did not make 
any reference to the doctrine. As explained above, the effective-vindication 
doctrine is a means of balancing competing public policies embodied in the 
FAA and other federal statutes. In contrast, “[preemption does not describe 
the effect of one federal law upon another; it refers to the supremacy of 
federal law over state law when Congress, acting within its enumerated 

284. For a rebuttal of the view that the Discover Bank rule was an obstacle to a fundamental 
objective of the FAA, see Breyer’s dissent, Concepcion, supra note 260, at 1758-61. 
285. Concepcion, supra note 260, at 1753. 
286. In fact, petitioner in Concepcion rightfully assumed that the effective-vindication rule was 
not in issue in the case. The petitioner stated the issue presented as follows:” Whether the Federal 
Arbitration Act preempts States from conditioning the enforceability of an arbitration agreement on 
the availability of particular procedures–here class-wide arbitration–when those procedures are not 
necessary to ensure that the parties to the arbitration agreement are able to vindicate their rights.” 
Brief for Petitioner Issue Presented, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 
09-893), 2010 WL 3017755. 
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powers, intends one to displace the other.”287 Because the effective-
vindication issue was not an issue, the Court did not have to decide whether 
the preclusion of class-wide arbitration would negatively affect the ability of 
claimants to vindicate their federal statutory rights.  In contrast to the 
preemption analysis, the effective-vindication analysis would have required 
the Court to balance the public policy favoring arbitration, enshrined in the 
FAA, with the need to vindicate the rights enshrined in other federal statutes. 
 The American Express litigation, to which we now turn, presented an 
opportunity for the Supreme Court to examine the modalities for conducting 
this balancing-of-policies analysis: the reconciliation of the pro-arbitration 
policies of the FAA with competing federal policies embodied in other 
federal statutes. It also provided an opportunity for the Court to examine 
whether the effective-vindication doctrine could be used to invalidate a class 
action waiver. We will examine the procedural history of the litigation, 
evaluate the Supreme Court decision, and explore the broader implications 
of the decision on the effective-vindication doctrine and on the development 
of American arbitration law. 
III. THE AMERICAN EXPRESS LITIGATION 
A. In the Second Circuit 
The case stemmed from a class-action law suit brought against 
American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., (Amex) by 
several merchants alleging that Amex had engaged in an illegal “tying 
arrangement” in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.288 The essential 
facts were that Amex charged substantially higher fees for its charge cards 
compared to other credit card providers, and merchants were willing to pay 
these fees because they believed that holders of charge cards were likely to 
be more affluent than holders of credit cards.289 When Amex began issuing 

287. Trollinger v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 370 F. 3d 5025–26, 608 (6th Cir. 2004). 
288. 15 U.S.C. § 1.  (2012). 
289. While charge card holders are required to pay the full balance on their accounts at the end 
of the billing cycle, holders of credit cards could make minimum payments at the end of the billing 
cycle and pay off the balance over time. See In re Am. Express Merchs’ Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 11742 1 n. 6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2006) (noting that “the credit card is a means of financing 
purchases” while “the charge card is a method of payment”). 
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credit cards, it charged significantly higher fees than other credit card 
providers, thereby decreasing the incentive for merchants to accept Amex’s 
credit cards. To ensure that merchants accepted its credit cards, Amex 
included an “Honor All Cards” provision in its card acceptance agreement 
with merchants. This obligated any merchant who accepted one of Amex’s 
card products as payment to honor “any card or other account access device 
issued by [Amex].”290 As a result, merchants who refused to honor Amex’s 
credit cards were not allowed to honor Amex’s charge cards, exposing them 
to the likelihood of losing “a significant portion of sales they receive[d] from 
businesses, travelers, affluent customers,” and other typical users of Amex 
charge cards.291  The merchants argued that the “Honor All Cards” 
obligation constituted an illegal tying arrangement.292 
The card acceptance agreement between Amex and the merchants 
contained a mandatory arbitration provision that included a waiver of class-
wide arbitration.293 When Amex moved to compel arbitration under the 
terms of the agreement, the merchants resisted on the grounds, inter alia, 
that the class action waiver contained in the agreement would preclude them 
from vindicating their statutory rights. This was because, according to them, 
“each individual plaintiff would have to incur discovery costs amounting to 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, despite seeking average damages of only 
$5000.”294 The district court held that the arbitration agreement was broad 
enough to apply to the disputes between the parties and that the merchants’ 
substantive claims, including that regarding the enforceability of the class 

290. In re Am. Express Merchs’ Litig., 554 F. 3d 300, 308 (2d Cir. 2009), [hereinafter “Amex 
I”]. 
291. Id. 
292. Tying arrangements have been defined as “an agreement by a party to sell one product but 
only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that 
he will not purchase that product from any other supplier.” N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958). Cited with approval in Amex I, id. at 308.,  supra  note 289, at 308. (quoting N. 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)). 
293. The relevant portion of the agreement provided as follows: 
IF ARBITRATION IS CHOSEN BY ANY PARTY WITH RESPECT TO A CLAIM, 
NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THAT CLAIM 
IN COURT OR HAVE A JURY TRAILTRAILTRIAL ON THAT CLAIM . . . 
FURTHER, YOU WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN A 
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY OR AS A MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF 
CLAIMANTS PARTAINIGPARTAINIGPERTAINING TO ANY CLAIM SUBJECT 
TO ARBITRATION. 
Amex I., supra note 289, at 306. 
294. In re Am. Express Merchs’ Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11742 at 4. 
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action waiver provision, were subject to arbitration.295 The court granted 
Amex’s motion to compel arbitration. Because it held that the enforceability 
of the class waiver provision was an issue for the arbitrator, the court did not 
rule on the merchants’ effective-vindication defense, although it was 
skeptical about its cogency.296 
On appeal, the Second Circuit held that it was proper for the lower court 
to decide the question of the enforceability of the class action waiver. It then 
proceeded to consider the merchants’ effective-vindication defense.  
According to the court, the issue was narrow: whether the class action 
waiver contained in the parties’ agreement was enforceable.297 The court 
distinguished this case from Gilmer298 by noting that, unlike in Gilmer, the 
merchants in the instant case were not arguing that the class action waiver 
was unenforceable merely because the relevant statute allowed class action. 
Instead they were contending that the enforcement of the class action waiver 
would preclude them from vindicating their statutory rights.299 Relevant to 
the case, in the court’s opinion, was Green Tree,300 which placed the burden 
on the claimant in an effective-vindication case to prove that arbitration was 
prohibitively expensive.301  In the view of the court, the merchants 
discharged this burden because there was abundant evidence in the record 
that they would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to arbitrate their 
disputes with Amex.  

295. See In re Am. Express Merchs' Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11742 at 6 (noting that 
issues relating to the enforceability of the class action waiver was for the arbitrator to decide “once 
arbitrability is established.”). 
296. In the view of the court, the “Plaintiffs’ contention . . . that the costs of individual 
arbitration would eclipse the value of any potential recovery, ignores the statutory protections 
provided by the Clayton Act…”  In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., id. at 5. Section 4 of the Act, 
which the court cited in support of this point, allows for recovery of triple damages, court costs and 
reasonable attorney’s fee. In light of plaintiffs’ claim that the discovery costs outweigh the possible 
average recovery by hundreds of thousands of dollars, the costs associated with the arbitration could 
still preclude the plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory rights. The trebling of small damages, on 
the plaintiffs’ account, would be insufficient to defray the cost of the expenses associated with the 
arbitration. 
297. Amex I, 554 supra note 289, at 305. 
298. Gilmer, supra note 124. 
299.  Amex I. supra note 124, at 314. 
300. 531Green Tree, supra note 161). 
301. Amex I, 554 supra note 289, at 315. 
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The unchallenged evidence in the record showed that the average 
merchant claimant “might expect four-year damages of $1,751, or $5,252 
when trebled” while “the out-of-pocket costs, just for the expert economic 
study and services, would be at least several hundred thousand dollars, and 
might even exceed $1million.”302 According to the court, the merchants had 
demonstrated “the necessity of some class mechanism” for the vindication of 
their statutory rights.  The evidence showed that “the size of the recovery 
received by any individual [merchant] will be too small to justify the 
expenditure of bringing an individual action.”303 The court agreed with the 
merchants that the practical consequence of enforcing the class action 
waiver would be that “no small merchant may challenge American 
Express’s tying arrangements under the federal antitrust laws.”304 In effect, 
the class action waiver operated to grant Amex de facto immunity from 
liability for violating its obligations under U.S. antitrust laws and was 
therefore unenforceable.305  
The court stressed that class action waivers were not per se 
unenforceable.  Each case had to be reviewed on its merits to gauge its effect 
on the ability of prospective claimants to vindicate their statutory rights.306  
In its decision, the Second Circuit sought to balance the pro-arbitration 
policies of the FAA with the public interest in ensuring that parties are able 
to vindicate their statutory rights.  Instructively, the court noted that this 
balancing analysis should be conducted “with a healthy regard for the fact 
that the FAA ‘is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements.’”307 
On a petition for writ of certiorari by Amex, the Supreme Court vacated 
the judgment and remanded it for reconsideration308 in light of its decision in 
Stolt-Nelsen.309  In that case, the court held that a party may not be 

302. Id. at 317 (testimony of Gary L. French, an economist retained by the merchants. Amex 
had suggested that the merchants could reduce the experts’ costs by sharing them with other 
merchants that were suing Amex in similar litigation. However, the court rejected this argument, 
noting that the parties’ agreement precluded the sharing of costs. The agreement provided that “[t]he 
arbitration proceeding and all testimony, filings, documents and any information relating to or 
presented during the arbitration proceedings shall be deemed to be confidential information not to be 
disclosed to any other party.” Id. at 318. 
303. Id. at 320. 
304. Id. at 319. 
305. Id. at 320. 
306. Id. at 321. 
307. Id. 
308. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
309. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
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compelled to “submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis 
for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”310  This principle derives 
from the fact that consent is one of the foundational principles of the 
FAA.311  Consequently, a party may not be forced into class wide arbitration 
without its consent.  In the Court’s view, in light of the fundamental changes 
brought by a change from bilateral to classwide arbitration, an arbitrator may 
not infer from the silence of the parties’ agreement that they had consented 
to class proceedings.312  
Stolt-Nelsen was, however, relevant to the effective-vindication analysis 
conducted by the Second Circuit.  The Second Circuit did not order class 
arbitration in its original decision.  What it did was find that the waiver of 
class arbitration was unenforceable because it operated to preclude the 
prospective claimants from vindicating their statutory rights.  Stolt-Nelsen 
stands for the principle that a party cannot be compelled to engage in class 
arbitration without its consent, and that silence of an arbitration agreement 
on the availability of class arbitration is not indicative of the contracting 
parties consenting to class arbitration.  Nothing in this principle suggests that 
the non-availability of class arbitration may not operate to confer de facto 
immunity to a prospective defendant, and thereby, have the consequence, as 
the Second Circuit found, of preventing a party from vindicating his or her 
federal statutory rights. 
On remand, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its previous decision, finding 
that its original analysis was not affected by Stolt-Nielsen.313  The court 
rightly noted that the analysis in its previous decision focused not on 
whether the parties’ agreement provided for class arbitration, but on whether 
the class action waiver precluded the merchants from effectively vindicating 
their federal statutory rights.314  The availability of a class action mechanism, 
in the court’s view, is important in this analysis.  The court noted that the 
Supreme Court itself had previously acknowledged the relevance of the class 
action mechanism as a “vehicle for vindicating federal statutory rights” in 
cases where it is the “only economically rational alternative” for prosecuting 

310. Id. at 1775. 
311. Id. 
312. Id. at 1776. 
313. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Amex II]. 
314. Id. at 193-94. 
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small-value claims.315  The Second Circuit reiterated its previous finding that 
“Amex has brought no serious challenge to the plaintiffs’ demonstration that 
their claims cannot reasonably be pursued as individual actions . . . in 
arbitration.”316  Accordingly, it reaffirmed its finding that the class action 
waiver was unenforceable as it precluded the claimants from effectively 
vindicating their statutory rights.317 
Shortly after Amex II was decided, the Supreme Court issued its ruling 
in Concepcion,318 invalidating the Discover Bank rule on the grounds that it 
was preempted by the FAA.  It would be recalled that the rule required the 
availability of class actions in certain consumer disputes.  The Second 
Circuit decided to consider the effect of Concepcion on its decision in Amex 
III.319  Concepcion was essentially a preemption case in which the court held 
that states cannot interfere with the realization of the fundamental objectives 
of arbitration by requiring the availability of class wide arbitrations.  
Instructively, the preemption analysis does not, as the effective-vindication 
analysis does, require the courts to balance the competing policies embodied 
in the FAA and other federal statutes.  For this reason, Concepcion did not 
have to determine whether the non-availability of class arbitration precluded 
the claimants from vindicating their statutory rights. 
The Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Amex III.  It found that 
while “Concepcion plainly offers a path for analyzing whether a state 
contract law is preempted by the FAA,” Amex was concerned with 
something different: the effective-vindication of statutory rights.320  It noted 
that Concepcion did not decide that class action waivers are per se 
enforceable,321 neither did it invalidate the effective-vindication doctrine 
articulated by the court in Mitsubishi and Green Tree.322  Applying the 
effective vindication doctrine, the court reaffirmed that because individual 
actions against Amex were not economically feasible, the class waiver 

315. Id. at 194 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974)) (“Economic 
reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as a class action or not at all.”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to 
overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a 
solo action prosecuting his or her rights.”). 
316. Amex II, 634 F.3d at 199 (citing Amex I, 554 F.3d at 319). 
317. Id. 
318. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
319. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Amex III]. 
320. Id. at 213. 
321. Id. at 214. 
322. Id. at 214-17. 
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provision effectively precluded the merchants from vindicating their 
statutory rights, and was therefore unenforceable.323  
The final phase in the protracted proceedings in the Second Circuit was 
the decision of the court denying a request for en banc review of its previous 
ruling.324  Concurring in the denial of en banc review, Circuit Judge Pooler 
reiterated the fact that unlike Concepcion, which dealt with the preemption 
of state “rights existing under a common law of unconscionability,” Amex 
involved a different question: “whether the FAA always trumps rights 
created by a competing federal statute.”325  
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Jacobs argued that Amex II swept 
too broadly and established a principle “that, in the hands of class action 
lawyers, can be used to challenge virtually every consumer arbitration 
agreement that contains a class action waiver.”326  He was concerned that 
such challenges involve “searching” inquiries that would add “more delay, 
expense, and uncertainty” to the arbitration process.327  It should be noted 
that the dissent did not weigh this efficiency argument against the 
fundamental objective of ensuring that claimants are able to vindicate their 
statutory rights.  The FAA surely reflects a pro-arbitration policy and 
promotes the use of arbitration as an efficient method of dispute resolution.  
However, the question remains whether the pro-arbitration policy of the 
FAA invariably trumps other competing polices embodied in other federal 
statutes?  The dissent did not provide an adequate answer to this question,328 
and as we shall see, neither did the majority of the Supreme Court which 
reversed the decision of the Second Circuit. 

323. Id. at 218–19.  The court emphasized the point that it was not ordering class arbitration, 
but was merely pronouncing on the enforceability of the class action waiver.  Id. at 219. 
324. In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litig., 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012) (hereinafter Amex IV). 
325. Id. at 140. 
326. Id. at 143 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
327. Id. at 144–45 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
328. Chief Judge Jacobs makes two crucial points that presage the decision of the majority of 
the Supreme Court  in this case.  He argues that since the Court in Concepcion has held that “the 
FAA preempts even state law that permits evasion of a class action waiver clause,” there was no 
basis for “permitting precisely the same sort of evasion as part” of an effective-vindication analysis.  
Id. at 146–47 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).  He further construes Green Tree as dealing with the “cost of 
access to an arbitral forum” and not the overall cost of litigation or arbitrating a claim.  Id. at 147 
(Jacobs, J., dissenting).  I consider these arguments below, as part of the evaluation of the Supreme 
Court’s decision. 
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B. In the Supreme Court: Narrowing the Scope of the Doctrine 
In the Supreme Court, Amex argued that, in reaching its decision, the 
Second Circuit ignored the FAA’s mandate that arbitration agreements 
should be enforced in accordance with their terms.  They also contended that 
the decision contravened Concepcion which, according to them, forbade 
“refus[ing] to enforce an arbitration agreement on the ground that it 
precluded class wide arbitration procedures.”329  Advocating a restrictive 
reading of Green Tree330 and Mitsubishi,331 Amex suggested that the former 
was concerned only with “costs associated with access to the arbitral 
forum,”332 while the latter dealt only with the refusal of arbitrators to apply 
federal substantive law.333  It disputed the policy arguments in support of 
class wide arbitrations.  In any event, Amex argued, the FAA compelled 
enforcement of the arbitration agreement and that “it is Congress’s 
prerogative to weigh [the competing policy considerations relating to the 
availability of classwide arbitration] and limit bilateral arbitration where it 
deems appropriate.”334 
Before the Supreme Court, the respondent merchants clarified that they 
were not insisting on class proceedings, but merely wanted to ensure that the 
arbitration agreement did not operate to preclude them from vindicating their 
federal statutory rights.335  They argued that the effective-vindication 
doctrine was a recognized part of the court’s jurisprudence,336 promoted the 
legitimacy of arbitration,337 and was broad enough to invalidate the instant 
arbitration agreement.338 

329. Brief for Petitioners at 27, Am. Express Co., et al., v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 
(2013) (No. 12-133), 2012 WL 6755152. 
330. Green Tree Financial Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
331. Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
332. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 328, at 18.  In Amex’s view, such costs included filing 
fees, arbitrator’s fees and other administrative fees, but did not extend to “litigation costs generally.”  
Id. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 19. 
335. Brief for Respondents, at 17–18, Am. Express Co., et al., v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. 
Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 267025. 
336. They disputed the narrow interpretation given to Mitsubishi and Green Tree by Amex.  In 
their view, the two cases and their progeny “does not turn on the precise way in which the agreement 
or the costs of arbitrating prevent the vindication of substantive rights.  What matters is whether, not 
precisely why, the federal statutory claims can be resolved in the arbitral forum.”  Id. at 25. 
337. They argued that enforcing arbitration agreement such as the instant one that precludes 
them from accessing the arbitral forum “may cause the public to lose confidence in arbitration as a 
legitimate mechanism of dispute resolution.”  Brief of Professional Arbitrators and Arbitration 
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It bears noting that the merchants advocated a narrow version of the 
effective-vindication doctrine.  Had this narrow version been accepted by the 
Court, it would have significantly limited the availability of the doctrine to 
prospective claimants.  According to the claimants, they were not insisting 
on class proceedings.  Their central concern was the availability of a 
mechanism that allowed them to recoup the costs associated with the 
proceedings, particularly the high expert costs, should they prevail.339  They 
were amenable to non-class arbitration so long as Amex was willing to allow 
a system that enabled them to recoup costs associated with the arbitration.  
To this end, they noted that “[i]f Petitioners prefer non-class arbitration, they 
could offer to shift Respondents’ costs, or they could permit Respondents to 
share those costs through mechanisms other than class proceedings.”340 
The position canvassed by the merchants would limit the applicability of 
cost-related effective-vindication challenges to cases where the non-
recoupable costs incurred by the potential claimants would be higher than 
their potential net recovery.  The practical consequence of this position 
would be to make effective-vindication challenges unavailable in cases 
where an arbitration agreement has a chilling effect on the ability of 
prospective claimants to bring a claim, especially where the maximum 
recovery in individual arbitrations is so low as to be worth the effort of 
prosecuting the claim.  As one commentator has rightly noted, “[o]nce the 
question has been reduced to a clinical calculation that asks only whether 
non-recoupable costs exceed the recovery sought . . . it should be clear that 
few camels will make it through the eye of this needle.”341  
The Supreme Court was to reject this narrow conception of cost-based 
effective-vindication challenge in favor of an even more parsimonious 
version.  
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia framed the issue before the 
Court as being “whether a contractual waiver of class arbitration is 

Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16, Am. Express Co., et al., v. Italian Colors 
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133), 2013 WL 457379. 
338. Brief for Respondents, supra note 334, at 57. 
339. Id. at 17–18. 
340. Id. at 18. 
341. Myrian E. Gilles, Gutting the Vindication-of-Rights Challenge to Arbitration Agreements, 
82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 25), available at  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2263401. 
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enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the plaintiff’s cost of 
individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeds the potential 
recovery.”342  The majority answered in the negative, holding that the 
effective-vindication doctrine applies where an arbitration agreement 
operates to eliminate the “right to pursue” a statutory claim, but not where it 
merely makes it “not worth the expense involved in proving a statutory” 
claim.343  In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the pro-arbitration 
mandate of the FAA, narrowly interpreted its decisions in Mitsubishi and 
Green Tree, and broadly construed its ruling in Concepcion.  
Scalia began by reiterating the view that § 2 of the FAA requires “courts 
[to] ‘rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.’”344  
In his view, the mandate to enforce arbitration agreements applies with equal 
force to federal statutory claims, unless the mandate “has been ‘overridden 
by a contrary congressional command.’”345  This framing of the issue blurs 
the historical context of the arbitrability of federal statutory claims.  The 
Court was initially cautious in allowing the arbitration of federal statutory 
claims.  In gradually allowing the arbitration of federal statutory claims, the 
Court recognized the need to balance the pro-arbitration mandate of the FAA 
with the policies embodied in other federal statutes.  While the Court has 
consistently viewed the FAA as rejecting the antiquated judicial hostility 
towards arbitration, it has in the past been careful to moderate the 
commitment to allowing the arbitration of federal statutory claims with the 
need to advance the functions of relevant federal statutory regimes.  The 
effective-vindication doctrine has served as the moderating mechanism in 
U.S. arbitration law. 
Prior decisions of the Supreme Court have stressed the importance of 
the doctrine as a limiting principle to the arbitrability of federal statutory 
claims.  For example, in rejecting the argument that, because of the 
important social policies promoted by the ADEA, arbitration was not an 
appropriate forum for arbitrating claims arising under the Act, the Court 
observed that: 

342. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2307.  The Court had granted certiorari to consider “[w]hether the 
Federal Arbitration Act permits courts . . . to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that 
they do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.”  Id. at 2308. 
343. Id. at 2311. 
344. Id. at 2309 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). 
345. Id. (citing CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669).  Scalia found that 
there was there was no congressional command requiring the invalidation of the waiver of class 
arbitration in the instant case.  Id. 
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We do not perceive any inherent inconsistency between those policies, however, and 
enforcing agreements to arbitrate age discrimination claims. . . . The Sherman Act, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed 
to advance important public policies, but [we have held that] claims under those statutes 
are appropriate for arbitration.  “[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may 
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will 
continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”346 
In contrast, Scalia minimizes the role of the effective-vindication 
doctrine as a limiting principle by stipulating “contrary congressional 
command” as the major limitation to the arbitrability of federal statutory 
claims.  He emphasizes that the effective-vindication exception originated as 
a dictum in Mitsubishi,347 seeming not to appreciate how the exception was 
central to the Court’s analysis.  While it is true that the Mitsubishi Court “did 
not hold that federal statutory claims are subject to arbitration so long as the 
claimant may effectively vindicate his rights in the arbitral forum,”348 the 
Court indicated in very strong terms that its finding on arbitrability was 
informed by the belief that the claimants would be able to vindicate their 
federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.  It was in this regard that it 
noted that “in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses 
operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would have little hesitation in 
condemning the agreement as against public policy.”349  Scalia’s dismissal of 
the doctrine as a dictum in Mitsubishi reveals his skepticism of its value.  He 
failed to indicate that the doctrine was “an essential condition”350 of the 
Court’s decision in Mitsubishi and that subsequent opinions of the Court 
have acknowledged its importance in enforcing arbitration agreements 
dealing with federal statutory claims. 
Tellingly, Scalia states the doctrine originated from “the desire to 
prevent ‘prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory 
remedies.’”351  In his view, this right would be implicated by arbitration 
agreements prohibiting prospective claimants from asserting federal 

346. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27-28 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). 
347. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
348. Id. at 2310 n.2. 
349. Mitsubishi, 473 U. S. at 637 n.19. 
350. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
351. Id. at 2310 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U. S. at 637 n.19). 
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statutory rights and by arbitrations where prohibitive filing and 
administrative fees make “access to the forum impracticable.”352  According 
to him, the doctrine would not apply where “the expense involved in 
proving” a claim precludes a party from vindicating his or her federal 
statutory rights; this expense “does not constitute the elimination of the right 
to pursue” the claim.353  In essence, he considers the rules in Mitsubishi and 
Green Tree as limited to the facts of the respective cases.  The former dealt 
with the application of federal substantive law in arbitration and the latter 
with the effect of prohibitive filing and administrative fees in arbitration. 
However, Mitsubishi and its progeny speak broadly about the ability of 
prospective claimants to vindicate their federal statutory claims in the 
arbitral forum.  The issue of the application of relevant federal substantive 
law that arose in Mitsubishi, and that of prohibitive filing and administrative 
fees that arose in Green Tree, were merely illustrations of a principle of 
general application.  As Justice Kagan rightly notes in her dissent, the two 
decisions “establish what in some quarters is known as a principle: When an 
arbitration agreement prevents the effective vindication of federal rights,” a 
court may invalidate the agreement.354  She notes that the principle would 
apply in a range of instances, reaching “the world of other provisions a 
clever drafter might devise to scuttle even the most meritorious of federal 
claims.”355  Viewed in this light, the central focus of effective-vindication 
inquiry ought not to be on the “precise mechanism” but on the overall effect 
of the arbitration agreement on the ability of prospective claimants to 
vindicate their statutory rights.356 
By interpreting Mitsubishi and its progeny so narrowly, the majority 
effectively shifted the focus of effective-vindication analysis from broader 
concerns about the ways in which arbitration agreements preclude access to 
justice in the arbitral forum to a more limited analysis of a notional “right to 
pursue” federal statutory claims.  It should be noted that this narrowing of 
effective-vindication inquiries is incompatible with the role the doctrine has 
played in reconciling the competing policies embodied in the FAA and other 
federal statutes.  It has hitherto served as a mechanism for reconciling the 

352. Id. at 2310–11. 
353. Id. at 2311. 
354. Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
355. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
356. Id. at 2317-18 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  She notes that a central tenet of the Court’s 
decisions on arbitration: “An arbitration clause may not thwart federal law, irrespective of exactly 
how it does so.”  Id. at 2313. 
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pro-arbitration mandate of the FAA with the public policies embodied in 
federal command statutes, thereby enabling courts to invalidate arbitration 
agreements that preclude the vindication of federal statutory claims.  
Prospective claimants may be precluded from vindicating their federal 
statutory rights not only when a notional “right to pursue” claims is 
eliminated but where the arbitration agreement and the structure of the 
arbitration process have the practical consequence of precluding access to 
the arbitral forum.  For example, the Sixth Circuit has used the doctrine to 
invalidate an agreement due to the structural bias of the arbitration process.  
Scalia’s narrowing of the focus of effective-vindication inquires would seem 
to preclude the use of the doctrine in this context.  On Scalia’s narrow 
construction, structural bias does not inhibit the “right to pursue” claims, 
even though it may have the practical consequence of ensuring that 
violations of federal statutory rights go without being redressed.  
The reconciliation of the FAA and other federal statutes requires more 
than the protection of the “right to pursue” claims in an arbitral forum.  It 
requires ensuring that arbitration does not become a forum for stifling 
federal statutory claims, a function that the effective-vindication doctrine has 
hitherto performed. 
Scalia probably believes that the FAA’s pro-arbitration mandate 
compels a narrow conception of the doctrine.  After all, the arbitrability of 
federal statutory claims can always be “overridden by a contrary 
congressional command.”357  However, Congress has rarely expressly 
excluded the arbitrability of federal statutory claims, a fact that does not 
necessitate the conclusion that Congress countenances the use of arbitration 
to stifle federal claims.  As Kagan notes, Congress did not intend the FAA to 
become “a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious 
federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”358  In enacting the 
FAA, Congress commanded the enforcement of arbitration as a tailored and 
streamlined mechanism for redressing injuries, not a means of granting “de 
facto immunity” to potential defendants.359 
Nonetheless, the majority has now narrowed the doctrine to protect only 
the “right to pursue” a claim.  According to Scalia this right is implicated 

357. Id. at 2309. 
358. Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
359. Id. at 2315, 2320. 
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when an agreement “forbid[s] the assertion of certain statutory rights” and 
“perhaps [when] filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration . . . are 
so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”360  In contrast, he 
indicates that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a 
statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue 
that remedy.”361  However, Scalia does not clearly explain why prohibitive 
filing and administrative fees may operate to eliminate the right, but costs 
associated with “proving” a claim would not.  Green Tree was concerned 
with the alleged effects of prohibitive filing and administrative fees, but 
there was nothing in that case that suggested that the doctrine would not 
apply to other expenses associated with arbitrating a dispute.362  In fact, there 
is little principled basis for confining cost-based effective-vindication 
challenges to prohibitive “filing and administrative fees,” a limitation the 
dissent characterized as a “weirdly idiosyncratic.”363  
In support of his decision that the arbitration agreement did not 
adversely affect the merchants’ “right to purse” their claims, Scalia observes 
that class action waivers merely limit arbitration proceedings to the 
contracting parties, but do not eliminate the right to pursue federal statutory 
claims.364  It is nonetheless evident that the non-availability of class-action 
proceedings may in particular instances make the expenses associated with 
arbitration, when compared to litigation, so prohibitive as to preclude a 
prospective claimant from vindicating their federal statutory rights.  This 
was precisely the argument made by the merchants.  Practically immunizing 
oneself from suit by making unavailable in compulsory arbitration 
procedures that are available to a party in litigation has the same practical 
consequence as eliminating the federal statutory claim.  
Scalia emphasizes that class action proceedings only became generally 
available in 1938, after the passage of the FAA.365  In his view, mechanisms 
that were considered sufficient to assure effective-vindication of a federal 
statutory right prior to the emergence of class-action procedures “did not 
suddenly become ‘ineffective vindication’ upon their adoption.”366  He 

360. Id.  at 2310–11. 
361. Id. at 2311. 
362. See id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that Green Tree “gave no hint of 
distinguishing among the different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to 
bring”). 
363. Id. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
364. Id. at 2311. 
365. Id. 
366. Id. 
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argues that “time does not change the meaning of effectiveness, making 
ineffective vindication today what was effective vindication in the past.”367  
But what is required for a party to vindicate its statutory rights is not frozen 
in time.  The focus ought not to be on what, at the time a particular statute 
was enacted, would preclude a right from being effectively vindicated, but 
on whether, at the time of the hearing, the arbitration agreement operates to 
preclude the effective vindication of rights.  After all, the doctrine is a 
method of reconciling the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA with the policy 
embodied in other federal command statutes.  What would enable a party 
properly to vindicate its rights may change over time.  In the instant context, 
the emergence of class-action proceedings substantially enhanced the ability 
of consumers and small-value claimants to prosecute federal statutory 
claims.  This materially altered the calculation of what is necessary to 
vindicate such claims in an arbitral forum.  
Cost-based effective-vindication analysis involves, in part, a comparison 
of the relevant costs of litigation and arbitration.  It is difficult to envisage a 
cost-based effective-vindication challenge succeeding where the cost of 
arbitration is lower than the cost of litigation.  In weighing the cost 
implications of arbitration agreements, courts look towards the relative costs 
of litigation and arbitration at the time of the proceedings, not the relative 
cost at the time the federal command statute was enacted.  Similarly, when 
the waiver of class arbitration is alleged to preclude the vindication of 
statutory rights, the focus should be on the current state of affairs.  Whether 
the procedural device in question was available at the time the federal statute 
was enacted is irrelevant in this regard.  As Kagan rightfully notes, “the 
effective-vindication rule asks about the world today, not the world as it 
might have looked when Congress passed a given statute.”368 
Scalia cites Gilmer369 and Vimar370 in support of his conclusion that the 
class waiver clause was enforceable.371  In Gilmer, the claimant had argued 
that arbitration of the claim would not adequately enhance the goals of the 

367. Id. 
368. Id. at 2319 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  She adds that the application of the doctrine “requires 
courts to determine in the here and now—rather than in ye olde glory days—whether an agreement’s 
provisions foreclose even meritorious [federal] claims.”  Id. 
369. 500 U.S. 20. 
370. 515 U.S. 528. 
371. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2311–12. 
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ADEA372 because the arbitration agreement in question did not “provide 
for . . . class actions.”373  The Court rejected the argument, holding that the 
fact that the ADEA provided for the possibility of class actions did not mean 
that it barred “individual attempts at conciliation.”374  It is noteworthy that 
the claimant in Gilmer, unlike those in Amex, did not argue that a class 
action waiver had the practical consequence of preventing them from 
vindicating their statutory claims.  Instead, the claimant in Gilmer was 
concerned that arbitration did not “adequately further the purposes of the 
ADEA,” merely because it did not provide for class proceedings.375  
Similarly, Vimar was not concerned with the effective vindication of 
federal statutory rights.  There, the claimant resisted a motion to compel 
arbitration on the grounds that the inconvenience and cost of the arbitration 
proceeding would lessen the liability of the carrier under the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act (CGSA).376  The Act prohibited agreements lessening the 
liability of a carrier.  The Court rejected this argument, noting that the 
CGSA did not “require courts to proceed case by case to tally the costs and 
burdens to particular plaintiffs in light of their means, the size of their 
claims, and the relative burden on the carrier.”377  Instructively, the 
claimants never argued that the cost of arbitration precluded them from 
vindicating their statutory claim.  Their argument was that those costs, 
together with the inconvenience of arbitration, lessened the liability of 
carrier.  When the Vimar Court stated that it was “unwieldy and unsupported 
by the terms or policy of the statute” to require the “tally[ing of] costs and 
burdens” of arbitration,378 it was considering whether such tallying was 
necessary to determine if an arbitration agreement lessened the liability of 
the carrier.  In contrast, such a tallying would be necessary in an effective-
vindication analysis, where the claim is not just that the liability of the 
defendant is lessened, but that an arbitration agreement would have the 
practical consequence of precluding the vindication of federal statutory 
rights.  

372. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012). 
373. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. 
376. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (1988). 
377. Vimar, 515 U.S. at 536. 
378. Id. 
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Scalia goes on to suggest that the Court’s decision in Concepcion379 “all 
but resolves this case.”380  He notes Concepcion decided that class 
arbitrations “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its 
informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to 
generate procedural morass than final judgment.”381  Concepcion, it would 
be recalled, held that a state court could not condition the enforceability of 
an arbitration agreement on the availability of class proceedings.  
Concepcion found that such a requirement would “interfere with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus create a scheme inconsistent 
with the FAA.”382  
However, the issue in Concepcion was not whether the arbitration 
agreement precluded the claimants from vindicating their statutory rights.  In 
fact, the claimants in Concepcion neither argued nor suggested that they 
could not vindicate their federal statutory rights under the framework of their 
arbitration agreement.  The concern of the Court in Concepcion was with the 
Discover Bank rule, a California rule, which conditioned enforcement of 
certain arbitration agreements on the availability of class proceedings.  The 
validity of this state rule did not require consideration of the effective-
vindication doctrine.  Moreover, as the majority noted in Concepcion, “the 
claim [in dispute] was most unlikely to go unresolved,” because the AT&T 
arbitration agreement in that case contained consumer-friendly provisions 
that provided adequate “incentive[s] for the individual prosecution of 
meritorious claims.”383  It was precisely because effective-vindication was 
not before it that the Concepcion Court did not cite the Court’s effective-
vindication precedents.384 
As Kagan notes in her dissent, Concepcion was a preemption case.385  
The central concern of the Court in Concepcion was whether the FAA 
preempted the California Discover Bank rule.386  Concepcion held that the 

379. 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
380. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312. 
381. Id. (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751). 
382. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748. 
383. Id. at 1753. 
384. Justice Kagan emphasizes this point in arguing Concepcion did not control the outcome of 
American Express.  Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
385. Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
386. See supra text accompanying note 256. 
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state rule was preempted by the FAA because it interfered with the 
fundamental objectives of the FAA.  Because Concepcion was a preemption 
case, the Court did not have to reconcile the pro-arbitration policy of the 
FAA with the policy embodied in other federal command statutes, as it is 
required to do in an effective-vindication inquiry.  As Kagan rightly notes, in 
preemption cases the Court has “no earthly interest (quite the contrary) in 
vindicating [the state] law.”387  Effective-vindication becomes relevant only 
where there is a conflict between the FAA and another federal statute.  In 
effective-vindication inquiries, unlike in preemption analysis, “one law does 
not automatically bow to the other, and the effective-vindication rule serves 
as a way to reconcile any tension between them.”388 
 Nonetheless, Scalia believes that Concepcion was more than a 
preemption case and that it establishes rules that apply broadly to 
arbitrations.  According to him, Concepcion categorically “rejected the 
argument that class arbitration was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might 
otherwise slip through the legal system.’”389  However, he did not discuss 
the reasons why the court rejected that argument.  The Court in Concepcion 
gave two reasons for that position.  The first was the fact that “States cannot 
require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable 
for unrelated reasons.”390  This consideration is, however, irrelevant in an 
effective-vindication inquiry, because the relevant tension is not with State 
law but with the policy embodied in a federal statute that has the same 
constitutional force as the FAA.  The second reason given by the 
Concepcion Court was that the claim involved in that case “was most 
unlikely to go unresolved” because of the consumer-friendly features of the 
arbitration agreement.391  In essence, the reasons Concepcion gave for 
rejecting the need for class arbitration were not directly relevant to the issues 
before the Court in Amex. 
In effect, Scalia decouples the Concepcion statement about class 
arbitration from its preemption context and uses it in service of a thinly 
founded effort to whittle down the scope of the effective-vindication 
doctrine.  This leads him to make the rather startling claim that Concepcion 
establishes that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements 

387. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
388. Id. 
389. Id. at 2312 (citing Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753). 
390. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
391. Id. 
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trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.”392  
What support does he provide for this sweeping declaration?  Nothing more 
than Concepcion’s rejection of the view that “class proceedings are 
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims,”393 a rejection that, as explained 
above, the Concepcion Court justified by reference to the preemption rule 
and by emphasizing the fact that the “claim [in Concepcion] was most 
unlikely to go unresolved.”394  From that rather thin premise, Scalia derives 
the sweeping generalization that the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration 
agreements invariably trumps any public interest in “ensuring the 
prosecution of low-value claims.”395  
Scalia concludes his judgment with an efficiency argument against cost-
based effective-vindication challenges.  According to him, such challenges 
would require courts to evaluate theories supporting a claim, the evidence 
necessary to prove them, and the damages recoverable in the event of 
success.396  He suggests that this pre-arbitration inquiry “would undoubtedly 
destroy the prospect of speedy resolution that arbitration in general and 
bilateral arbitration in particular was meant to secure.”397  He states that such 
a judicially-created inquiry is not sanctioned by the FAA.398  Tellingly, 
Scalia never mentions the countervailing concern of enabling claimants to 
vindicate their federal statutory rights.  Efficiency is certainly one of the 
laudable advantages of arbitration and one of the compelling reasons for 
embracing arbitration as an alternative to litigation.  In fact, the expeditious 
resolution of disputes was a motivating consideration for the enactment of 
the FAA.  However, efficiency is not invariably the determinative 
consideration, especially where it comes into conflict with the vindication of 
vital rights granted by Congress.  By stating the efficiency argument without 
counterbalancing it with other competing policy considerations, Scalia fails 
to conduct the kind of careful balancing of interests required in effective-
vindication inquiries.  

392. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5. 
393. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
394. Id. 
395. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5. 
396. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. 
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What is more, the efficiency argument is not as compelling as it appears 
at first blush.  The effective-vindication doctrine has been a part of U.S. 
arbitration law since it was first propounded in Mitsubishi.  Yet there is little 
evidence that it has proven an obstacle to the speedy resolution of disputes in 
arbitration.  There is no evidence that these inquires have “destroy[ed] the 
prospect of speedy resolution” of disputes by arbitration.399  Moreover, the 
Court has put a heavy burden of proof on claimants in effective-vindication 
challenges.400  This burden has proved difficult in practice for most 
claimants to sustain, with the result that most of the challenges end in 
failure.  As Kagan notes, the court has placed limits on the doctrine “which 
ensure that it does not diminish arbitration’s benefits.”401  Consequently, the 
doctrine has “operated year in and year out without undermining, much less 
‘destroy[ing],’ the prospect of speedy dispute resolution that arbitration 
secures.”402 
Kagan’s dissent demonstrates a keen understanding of the role the 
doctrine has played in ensuring access to justice in arbitration, in 
legitimizing the role of arbitration, and in reconciling the policies reflected 
in the FAA with those embodied in other federal statutes.  She notes that the 
doctrine is a “limiting principle” to the arbitrability of federal statutory 
claims, aimed at safeguarding federal rights.403  The doctrine operates to 
prevent prospective defendants from immunizing themselves from liability 
for violations of federal statutes.404  It ensures that arbitration agreements do 
not “chok[e] off a plaintiff’s ability to enforce congressionally created 
rights.”405 
Unlike Scalia, Kagan attempts to reconcile the doctrine with the FAA.  
She puts the FAA in its proper historical context, noting that it favors 
arbitration as a flexible and streamlined method of resolving disputes, not a 
forum for snuffing out legitimate claims.406  The FAA was not designed as 
an enabling device for conferring de facto immunity to prospective 

399. Id. 
400. See supra text accompanying note 172. 
401. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
402. Id. at 2316 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
403. Id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  She notes that the doctrine was “an essential 
condition” for permitting the arbitration of federal statutory claims.  Id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
404. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the doctrine precludes arbitration 
agreements from “operat[ing] to confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims”). 
405. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
406. Id. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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defendants, she observes, but as a method of promoting actual resolution of 
disputes in arbitrations.407  The effective-vindication doctrine advances this 
goal “by ensuring that arbitration remains a real, not faux, method of dispute 
resolution.”408  It does this, in part, by incentivizing prospective defendants 
to fashion arbitration procedures that facilitate, not impede, the efficient 
resolution of disputes.409  The realization that courts would refuse to enforce 
agreements that operate to immunize prospective defendants from liability 
for violating federal laws encourages the formation of arbitration agreements 
that promote actual resolution of disputes.  Kagan notes that while the 
doctrine provides a conducive environment for “[m]ore arbitration [and] 
better enforcement of federal statutes,” its absence would lead to “[l]ess 
arbitration [and] poorer enforcement of federal statutes.”410  She cautions 
that the majority’s attenuation of the doctrine may lead arbitration “to 
become . . . a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious 
federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”411  This would be far 
from the tailored and streamlined system facilitating the redress of injuries 
envisaged by the drafters of the FAA. 
In contrast to Scalia, Kagan views Mitsubishi412 and Green Tree413 as 
establishing a principle of general application barring the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements that prevent the vindication of federal rights.414  Also 
in contrast to Scalia, she recognizes that this principle applies in a diverse 
range of circumstances,415 extending beyond non-application of federal 
substantive law and prohibitive costs of accessing arbitration, the two areas 
to which Scalia was inclined to confine the doctrine.416  For Kagan, the focus 
is not on the precise nature of the measure in question, but on whether it 
operates to preclude the vindication of a party’s federal right. This leads her 

407. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“What the FAA prefers to litigation is arbitration, not de facto 
immunity”). 
408. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
409. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
410. Id. (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
411. Id. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
412. 473 U.S. at 614. 
413. 531 U.S. at 79. 
414. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2317 (Kagan). 
415. Id. at 2317–18. 
416. Id. at 2310–11. 
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to reject as “weirdly idiosyncratic” the attempt to limit cost-based effective-
vindication challenges to those areas that were at issue in Green Tree and 
Mitsubishi.417  She views the principle as being broad enough to “cover the 
world of . . . provisions a clever drafter might devise to scuttle even the most 
meritorious federal claims.”418 
Kagan puts the effective-vindication doctrine in its broader historical 
context and demonstrates how the doctrine is both consistent with and also 
furthers the goals of the FAA.  Nonetheless, in applying the rule to the facts 
of the case, she essentially adopts the narrow version of the doctrine 
advanced by the respondents.  Under this view, cost-based effective-
vindication challenges would succeed only where the costs associated with 
arbitrating a claim do not preclude a party from vindicating a federal 
statutory claim.  Her major concern with the arbitration agreement in dispute 
was that its provisions had the consequence of making the costs associated 
with the arbitration, particularly the expert fees, prohibitive.419   
The arbitration agreement did not only include a class-action waiver, but 
it also precluded “any avenue for sharing, shifting, or shrinking necessary 
costs.”420  The result was that respondent’s outlay for the arbitration would 
be substantially higher than their largest possible recovery.  In essence, the 
arbitration agreement ensured that the respondents would “[s]pend way, way 
more money than [their] claim is worth, or relinquish your [federal statutory 
rights].”421  In Kagan’s view, a rational actor would not elect to incur such 
expenses in return for so little return.422 
Instructively, Kagan believes that a more consumer-friendly arbitration 
agreement, even one containing a class-waiver, would have survived an 
effective-vindication challenge.  She notes that an effective-vindication 
challenge is concerned with “whether the arbitration agreement as a whole 
precludes a claimant from enforcing federal statutory rights,” and that the 
provisions should not be evaluated in isolation because they may “close off 

417. Id. at 2318. Kagan noted that there was nothing distinctive about the filing and arbitrator’s 
fees that were in issue in Green Tree. Moreover, she added, Green Tree “gave no hint of 
distinguishing among the different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to 
bring.” Id. 
418. Id. at 2317. 
419. Id. at 2316. 
420. Id. 
421. Id. 
422. Id. (noting that the claim was worth “tens of hundreds of dollars” while the costs 
associated with the arbitration would run into “the hundreds of thousands.”). 
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one avenue to pursue a claim while leaving others open.”423  In her view, the 
arbitration agreement containing the class-waiver would not have offended 
the effective-vindication doctrine “if it had provided an alternative 
mechanism to share, shift, or reduce necessary costs.”424  For her, the 
decisive consideration was that it foreclosed the use of those mechanisms, 
such as “informal coordination among individual claims.”425  
Scalia’s rejection of Kagan’s, and the respondents’, narrow conception 
of the effective-vindication doctrine and his espousal of an even more 
limited conception marks the decline of the doctrine.  Severely limited by 
the majority decision, the doctrine will no longer be helpful in ensuring the 
prosecution of small value claims.  We now turn to the broad implications of 
Scalia’s parsimonious version of the effective-vindication doctrine. 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NARROWING OF THE EFFECTIVE-VINDICATION 
DOCTRINE 
A. Small Value Claims 
Amex substantially narrows the avenues for resisting the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements where they practically limit access to justice.  
Although Amex involved a business dispute regarding the enforcement of 
antitrust laws, it will have stronger resonance outside this context. Its impact 
will especially be felt in the areas of consumer transactions and labor 
relations, areas where class proceedings are frequently the most effective 
mechanism for vindicating the statutory rights of prospective claimants.  
Amex has essentially limited the availability of effective-vindication 
challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements to cases where 
they interfere with the exercise of the “right to pursue” federal statutory 
remedies.426  The exercise of this notional “right to pursue” federal statutory 
claims is not, in the view of the majority, implicated where the costs 
associated with arbitration make it “not worth the expense involved in 

423. Id. at 2318 (emphasis in original). 
424. Id. (emphasis in original). 
425. Id. 
426. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. 
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proving a statutory remedy.”427  According to the majority, the right is 
implicated only where arbitration agreements “forbid[] the assertion of 
certain statutory rights” and “perhaps . . . [where] filing and administrative 
fees attached to arbitration are so high as to make access to the forum 
impracticable.”428  
The reality is that in many consumer transactions and employee wage-
and-hour suits brought under the FLSA, individual recoveries are often 
notoriously lower than the costs associated with individual arbitration.  Class 
proceedings are consequently the most effective mechanism for prosecuting 
these claims. Individually unviable, these suits become economically 
feasible to prosecute when aggregation ensures the sharing of costs and 
expenses.  Hitherto, consumers and employees have used effective-
vindication challenges for resisting the enforcement of class action waivers 
in small value claims.  The usual argument is that these waivers operate to 
preclude small value claimants from vindicating their statutory rights 
because the individual prosecution of these claims is frequently 
economically unfeasible.  Sadly, Amex has now all but eliminated this 
ground for resisting class action waivers.  
Proponents of class action waivers often contend that “informal 
coordination among claimants” is a way of encouraging the prosecution of 
small value claims.  Interestingly, Kagan suggests this as a solution.429  
Along this line, one commentator has suggested that where class 
proceedings are waived, consumers can “band together to share the cost of 
attorneys’ fees and expert fees.”430  In his view, even though small value 
claimants would have to pursue their claims individually, “sharing costs 
could make their claims economically viable.”431  However, practice belies 
this claim. Characterizing this view as “magical thinking,” another 
commentator has aptly noted that “courts have tossed hundreds of class 
actions in the two years since Concepcion, and none of them was 
subsequently revived as a mass of individual arbitrations with shared 
costs.”432 

427. Id. at 2311 (emphasis omitted). 
428. Id. at 2310–11. 
429. See text accompanying note 424, supra. 
430. Andrew Pincus, quoted in Alison Frankel, What Hope Remains for Consumers, 
Employers after SCOTUS Amex Ruling, REUTERS BLOG (June 20, 2013), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2013/06/20/what-hope-remains-for-consumers-employees-
after-scotus-amex-ruling-2/. 
431. Id. 
432. See Paul Bland, quoted in Alison Frankel, id. 
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Amex indicates that the effective-vindication inquiry focuses on the 
ability of individual claimants to exercise their “right to pursue” statutory 
remedies.  On this view, the question is whether an arbitration agreement 
adversely precludes an individual claimant from exercising his or her right to 
pursue a federal statutory claim.  This may result from the agreement 
forbidding the assertion of the right or from filing and administrative fees 
that make access impracticable.  However, most arbitration clauses do not 
prevent the assertion of federal statutory claims.  Consequently, the first 
prong of the right would rarely be at issue. With respect to the second prong, 
“consumer-friendly” arbitration agreements will become increasingly 
relevant.  These agreements seek to reduce the cost of filing and 
administrative fees without necessarily addressing the issue of economic 
unviability of individual claims.  Even though they may reduce filing and 
administrative fees borne by small-value claimants, these “consumer-
friendly” arbitration provisions do not usually provide sufficient incentive 
for prospective claimants to prosecute legitimate grievances.  It is often 
difficult to find attorneys willing to handle such low-value claims 
individually.  Class proceedings, which enable the accumulation of costs and 
benefits, provide incentives for the prosecution of these claims.  In effect, 
these “consumer-friendly” provisions, which would pass the test under the 
second prong of the “right to pursue statutory claims,” leave unaddressed the 
potential chilling effect that class action waivers have on the ability of small-
value claimants to vindicate their federal statutory rights.  To make matters 
worse, Scalia declares that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration 
agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value 
claims.”433  
Amex has virtually eliminated the relevance of the availability of class 
proceedings to effective-vindication inquires.  The majority suggests that 
class action waivers do not interfere with the “right to pursue” statutory 
remedies because they “merely limit[] arbitration to the two contracting 
parties.”434  It rejects “the argument that class arbitration [is] necessary to 
prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the legal system.’”435  

433. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5. 
434. Id. at 2311. 
435. Id. at 2307. 
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The consequence is that it would be a fool’s errand to challenge the 
enforcement of a class action waiver with respect to small-value claims.  
The “savings clause” of the FAA remains an available method of 
challenge.436  However, its scope limited; it permits courts to invalidate 
arbitration agreements based on “generally applicable contract defenses, 
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”437  Moreover, the availability of 
the unconscionability challenge and the foundation for the first wave of 
challenges to the enforcement of class action waivers438 have been 
significantly limited by Concepcion.439  Concepcion decided that the 
“savings clause” does not allow courts to invalidate arbitration agreements 
based on “defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning 
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”440 
 
B. Effective Vindication of State Rights 
 To what extent does Amex affect cases where state courts have used 
the effective-vindication doctrine to invalidate arbitration agreements for 
preventing the vindication of state, as opposed to federal, statutory rights?  
This question did not arise directly in Amex; however, the opinions of both 
the majority and the dissent suggest that the effective-vindication doctrine 
does not apply to the vindication of state rights.  
  Some state courts have used effective-vindication arguments in 
refusing to enforce class action waivers.  For example, in Gentry v. Superior 
Court,441 the California Supreme Court held that in some situations, class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements “would undermine the vindication 
of the employees’ unwaivable statutory rights and would pose a serious 
obstacle to the enforcement of [state statutes.]”442  The Gentry rule called for 
California courts to invalidate arbitration agreements containing class action 
waivers where a review of relevant factors443 indicates that “class arbitration 

436. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
437. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. 
438. See Gilles, supra note 239, at 399. 
439. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748 (noting that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide 
arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration.”). 
440. Id. at 1746. 
441. Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007). 
442. Id. at 450. 
443. The case involved a claim for violation of statutory rights to overtime pay. According to 
the court, the relevant factors include the size of the potential recovery and “other real world 
78
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss3/4
5$!0;>/=A?.<:;>6 
			

>?=
is likely to be a significantly more effective means of vindicating [state 
statutory rights] than individual litigation or arbitration, and . . . that the 
disallowance of class action will likely lead to a less comprehensive 
enforcement of [the applicable state statute].”444  The Gentry rule was a 
clarification of the Discover Bank rule445 that was invalidated by 
Concepcion. 
 It is doubtful that the Gentry rule survived Concepcion, which clearly 
indicated that state courts may not condition the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements on the availability of class proceedings.  The continued validity 
of the rule is currently under review by the California Supreme Court 
in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation of Los Angeles.446  Several federal 
decisions have held that the rule did not survive Concepcion,447 and 
California decisions have questioned its continued validity.448 
There is, in fact, no principled basis for distinguishing the Gentry rule 
from the Discover Bank rule, which was invalidated in Concepcion.  Like in 
the Discover Bank rule, the Gentry rule calls for the invalidation of class 
action waivers where this is compelled by an evaluation of factors, such as 
size of the potential individual recovery, the inequality in bargaining power 
of the parties, and “other real world obstacles” to the individual prosecution 

obstacles to the vindication of class member’s rights to overtime pay through individual arbitration.” 
Id. at 568. 
444. Id. 
445. The Gentry court stated that it had granted review “to clarify our holding in Discover 
Bank,” Id. at 560. 
446. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. of L.A. L.L.C., 286 P.3d 147 (2012). 
447. See, e.g., Morvant v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 870 F. Supp.2d 831, 840 (N.D.Cal. 
2012) (“[T]he Court can find no principled basis to distinguish between Discover Bank, which was 
expressly overruled in Concepcion, and Gentry”); Sanders v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC., 843 F. 
Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (“Concepcion 'effectively overrules Gentry' because 
Gentry prohibits the arbitration of claims brought under California labor laws in certain 
contexts.”); Lewis v. UBS Fin. Servs. Inc., 818 F. Supp.2d 1161, 1167 (N.D.Cal. 2011) 
("Conception effectively overrules Gentry”). 
448. See, e.g., Truly Nolen of Am. v. Superior Court, 145 Cal. Rptr. 3d 432, 435  (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2012),  (“Although Conception's reasoning strongly suggests that Gentry's holding is 
preempted by federal law, the United States Supreme Court did not directly rule on the class 
arbitration issue in the context of unwaivable statutory rights and the California Supreme Court has 
not yet revisited Gentry”.); Kinecta Alternative Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 347, 355 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) ("A question exists about whether Gentry survived the overruling 
of  Discover Bank  in  Concepcion, but it is not one we need to decide.”); Brown v. Ralphs Grocery 
Co., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 854 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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of claims.449  This analysis essentially involves the evaluation of state policy 
considerations, which Concepcion rejected as grounds for invalidating class 
action waivers in arbitration agreements.  As the Court stressed in 
Concepcion, regardless of how desirable a particular procedure may be in 
light of state policy interests, a state may not enact such a procedure if it is 
inconsistent with the FAA.450  Moreover, Concepcion has made it clear that 
a state may not require the availability of classwide arbitration as a condition 
for enforcing arbitration agreements as this would “interfere[] with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration.”451 
Amex rejects the arguments for requiring availability of classwide 
arbitration as a condition for enforcing arbitration agreements.  According to 
Scalia, Concepcion “specifically rejected the argument that class arbitrations 
was necessary to prosecute claims ‘that might otherwise slip through the 
legal system.’”452  To buttress this point, Scalia noted, “the FAA  . . . 
favor[s] the absence of litigation when that is the consequence of a class-
action waiver, since its ‘principal purpose’ is the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements according to their terms.”453  
The cumulative effect of Amex and Concepcion is effectively to 
abrogate the Gentry rule.  Amex reiterated the preemption of state rules that 
condition the enforceability of arbitration agreements based on the 
availability of class proceedings, even when these rules are aimed at 
ensuring the vindication of state statutory rights. 
Post-Concepcion, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has 
articulated an effective-vindication theory that seeks to invalidate class 
action waivers that preclude a party from vindicating state statutory rights.  
In Feeney v. Dell Inc.454 the court held that the effective-vindication doctrine 
may be used to invalidate a class action waiver “where the class waiver 
provision has conferred on the defendant de facto immunity from private 
civil liability for violations of State law.”455  This would be the case “where 
plaintiff can demonstrate that he or she lacks the ability to pursue a claim 
against the defendant in individual arbitration according to the terms of the 

449. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005). 
450. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748, 1753. 
451. Id. at 1748. 
452. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2307. 
453. Id. at 2312 n.5. 
454. Feeney v. Dell Inc., 989 N.E.2d 439, 460 (Mass. 2013). 
455. Id. 
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agreement.”456  The court required an individual factual inquiry to determine 
whether “class proceedings are the only viable way for a consumer . . . to 
bring a claim against a defendant, as may be the case where the claims are 
complex, the damages are demonstrably small and the arbitration agreement 
does not feature the safeguards found in the Concepcion agreement.”457  The 
court was particularly concerned that businesses should not be allowed “[t]o 
use class action waivers as a means to exculpate themselves from liability 
for small value claims.”458 
Even if it was previously in dispute whether Concepcion foreclosed this 
application of the effective-vindication rule, Amex makes it clear that it does.  
The concern of ensuring the prosecution of small value claims, which 
underlay the Feeney decision, has been rendered irrelevant by Scalia’s 
declaration that “the FAA’s command to enforce arbitration agreements 
trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.”459  
Moreover, Amex reiterated the Court’s rejection of the necessity of class 
proceedings for prosecuting claims that may “slip through the legal 
system.”460 
There remains the important question whether the effective-vindication 
doctrine is even relevant in the context of the vindication of state, as 
opposed to federal, statutory rights.  The effective-vindication doctrine has 
traditionally been viewed as a mechanism for resolving the tension between 
the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA, and the realization of the policies 
embodied in other federal command statutes.  The assumption is that in 
commanding the enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA, 
Congress did not intend to undermine the vindication of rights it creates in 
other statutes.  The doctrine enables courts to refuse to enforce arbitration 
agreements despite the pro-arbitration mandate of the FAA in cases that 
would preclude a claimant from vindicating his or her federal statutory 
rights.  This reconciliation of tension is not relevant where a state law is 
inconsistent with the FAA, as the latter would preempt the former under the 

456. Id. 
457. Id. at 501-02. 
458. Id. at 444 (citing an earlier decision in Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th 
Cir. 2007)). 
459. Amex, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 n.5 (2013). 
460. Id. at 2307. 
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Supremacy Clause.461  As a court has noted, “there is no principled reason to 
apply the [effective-vindication] doctrine to bar arbitration claims grounded 
in state laws which were not created by Congress.”462 
Although Scalia did not directly discuss whether the effective-
vindication doctrine applies in connection with state laws,463 Kagan clarifies 
the reach of the doctrine. According to her, the doctrine is an important 
“limiting principle, designed to safeguard federal rights . . . .”464  She 
distinguished preemption analysis, which is relevant when a state law 
conflicts with the FAA, and an effective-vindication inquiry, which is 
relevant “when the FAA is alleged to conflict with another federal law.”465  
She stresses that in the federal context “one law does not automatically bow 
to the other.”466  Consequently, the doctrine serves the function of 
reconciling any tension between the FAA and other federal laws.467 
Because the doctrine is limited to the federal context, it cannot be the 
basis for sustaining the application of a state rule that conflicts with the 
FAA.  As Concepcion makes clear, state laws that “stand[] as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [the 
FAA]”468 are preempted by the FAA, even when they promote desirable 
social ends.  The Feeney court acknowledged this point, noting that its rule 
invalidating class-waivers in arbitration agreements where they preclude the 
vindication of state statutory rights was sound “not because it can be 
harmonized with the FAA,” but because it believed that the rule did not 
conflict with the FAA.469  However, Amex now makes it clear that such a 
rule conflicts with the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements. 

461. See Gilles, supra note 254, at 641 (explaining the difference between preemption and 
effective-vindication analysis). 
462. Orman v. Citigroup, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131532, 9 (S.D.N.Y., 2012). See also 
Kilgore v. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F. 3d 947, 961 (9th Cir. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 697 F. 3d 1181 
(9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the limits on the reach of the FAA “may be found only in other federal 
statutes, not in state law or policy”), aff’d en banc, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013). 
463. Scalia references the respondent by saying that the doctrine “serves to harmonize 
competing federal policies by allowing courts to invalidate agreements that prevent the ‘effective 
vindication’ of a federal statutory right.” Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2310. Scalia, however, did not express 
his view on whether the doctrine applies only to the harmonization of federal statutes. 
464. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2314 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
465. Id. at 2320. (emphasis in original). 
466. Id. 
467. Id. 
468. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
469. Feeney v. Dell Inc., 465 Mass. 470, 494.  As argued above, Amex now makes it clear that 
the rule conflicts with the FAA. 
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V. THE CASE FOR A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
By limiting the availability of the effective-vindication doctrine and by 
stressing that the FAA “trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of 
low-value claims,”470 Amex weakens the protections and rights afforded to 
consumers, employees, and others by federal statutes.  In the wake of Amex 
and Concepcion, a carefully worded arbitration agreement containing a class 
action waiver might make it practically unfeasible for prospective claimants 
to vindicate their statutory rights.  Together, both decisions significantly 
limit the mechanisms for resisting enforcement of arbitration agreements 
that operate substantively to limit access to justice.471  
After Concepcion, it was no longer permissible for states to condition 
enforcement of arbitration agreements on the availability of class 
proceedings.  Amex added that the availability of class proceedings is not 
necessary for the effective vindication of statutory rights,472 even where such 
proceedings are the only viable mechanism for prosecuting such statutory 
claims.  We are told that it is relevant that these claims may fall through the 
cracks of the system and go without redress.473  According to the Court in 
Amex, the interest in enforcing arbitration agreements supersedes the interest 

470. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 n.5. 
471. Amex compounds the negative effect Concepcion has had on access to justice. Following 
the Court’s decision in Concepcion, one commentator noted: “The notion that an injured person has 
a right to his or her day in court is deeply ingrained in American culture.  But the proliferation of 
arbitration agreements, and the Supreme Court’s aggressive enforcement of them, means that it is 
increasingly a myth that an injured person can sue.” See Erwin Chemerinsky, Op-Ed., Supreme 
Court: Class (action) dismissed, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2011.) 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/10/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-class-action-20110510.  Amex 
has now made it clear that the interest in the aggressive enforcement of arbitration agreements 
“trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of low-value claims.” See Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 
n.5. 
472. While class proceedings have their limitations, they serve as a crucial mechanism for 
protecting the interest of consumers and employees.  As one commentator has observed, there are 
ongoing legislative efforts to reform the class action procedures and it is this legislative procedure; 
Congress as well as federal and state rules committees,  “rather than companies themselves, are best 
positioned to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of class actions and refine the rules as needed.  We 
should not allow companies to shortcut the legislative process by using arbitration to abolish class 
actions.”  Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to 
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 725 (2012). 
473. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2312. 
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in ensuring that claimants are able in practice to seek redress for violations 
of their statutory rights. 
Amex stresses that that the FAA embodies the “overarching principle 
that arbitration is a matter of contract”474 and indicates “courts must 
‘rigorously enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.’”475  It is 
trite that arbitration is a matter of contract and is based on the consent of the 
parties.  What is often lost in this declaration of principle is the reality that in 
most consumer transactions and employment relations, consumers and 
employees do not have the bargaining power to negotiate predispute 
arbitration agreements that would enable them adequately to protect their 
statutory rights.  This is not an argument against enforcing arbitration 
agreements in consumer and employment contracts,476 but one for caution in 
reviewing the use of arbitration in these areas.477  
The Discover Bank rule478 was motivated in part by the recognition that 
inequality in bargaining power between contracting parties may result in an 
arbitration that operates essentially to immunize the stronger party from 
liability for injury to the weaker party.479  The Discover Bank court used 
unconscionability analysis to invalidate a category of these agreements.  
Concepcion severely limited the scope of unconscionability challenges to the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.  To compound this trend, Amex now 
makes it clear that the effective-vindication doctrine, hitherto considered a 
viable, if limited, method of protecting statutory rights, confers only a 
notional “right to pursue” statutory remedies.  Amex construes this right so 
narrowly that it would scarcely be of use to most prospective claimants. 

474. Id.  at 2309. 
475. Id. (citation omitted). 
476. In fact, arbitration has some useful benefits in the resolution of certain consumer and 
employment disputes. See, e.g., George Padis, Arbitration Under Siege: Reforming Consumer and 
Employment Arbitration and Class Actions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 665, 691-96 (2013) (noting that 
arbitration, in some contexts, offers benefits to consumers and employees). 
477. For a discussion of the case for reform instead of abolishing the use of arbitration the use 
of arbitration in consumer and employment transactions, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and 
Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration 
Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 469 (2011) (arguing for reform of the arbitration regime 
instead of abolishing the use of arbitration in consumer and employment transactions, “so that 
consumer arbitration may truly become a useful and beneficial alternative dispute resolution 
process.”). 
478. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal 2005); see supra text 
accompanying note 256. 
479. Id. at 1110.  Part of the relevant factors under the rule was whether “the party with the 
superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of 
consumers out of individually small sums of money.” Id. 
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In addition to the problem of unequal bargaining power, there are also 
other structural issues that sometimes negatively affect perception of the 
fairness of the arbitration process, particularly in the consumer and 
employment contexts.  These structural issues, such as “repeat player 
effect”480 and structurally biased arbitration agreements, necessitate a 
legislative framework for ensuring that arbitration is a fair and neutral 
process for resolving consumer and employment disputes.481  This is 
especially necessary because these disputes typically implicate statutory 
rights serving important public policy goals. 
Furthermore, Amex will have the effect of inhibiting the realization of 
the deterrence function of federal command statutes by shifting the focus of 
effective-vindication analysis to the ability of individual claimants to 
exercise their “right to pursue” statutory claims, and by not considering the 
chilling effect arbitration agreements may have in precluding prospective 
claimants from vindicating their rights.  The Court has previously 
acknowledged the importance of the deterrence function of these statutes in 
the context of arbitration,482 but the practical consequence of its decision in 
Amex and Concepcion is to inhibit the realization of this function by 
enabling some businesses to practically immunize themselves from liability 
for violations of these statutes.483   
The United States is exceptional in the sense of not affording some 
protections to consumers with respect to the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements.484  As one commentator has noted, “[t]he United States has been 
exceptional in its strict enforcement of [Business-to-Consumer] 
arbitration . . . while other nations have refused or limited enforcement of 

480. For a discussion of this effect in the employment context, see Lisa B. Bingham, 
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997). 
481. See Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not Be an All 
or Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 311-14 (2012) (stressing the need for procedural 
safeguards in employment arbitrations.). 
482. See supra text accompanying note 128. 
483. See Sternlight, supra note 471, at 704 (noting that Concepcion afforded “companies with 
free rein to commit fraud, torts, discrimination, and other harmful acts without fear of being sued.”). 
484. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, American Exceptionalism in Consumer Arbitration, 10 
LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 81, 83 (2012) (arguing that unlike the United States, other countries 
restrict the availability of arbitration in consumer transactions; Schmitz examined the practice in 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.). 
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these arbitrations due to public policy.”485  The Court compounded this 
problem.  It gave an expansive interpretation to the FAA, in the process 
broadening its scope,486 while paying scant attention to the need to ensure 
that the arbitral process does not become a means for some businesses to 
immunize themselves from liability for violating statutory rights.  Left 
unchecked, the Court’s trend towards whittling down the range of defenses 
available against the enforcement of arbitration agreements—a trend 
exemplified by the narrowing of the effective-vindication defense in Amex—
would lead to the continuing erosion of the substantive rights conferred by 
statutes.  
A legislative response has become necessary to regulate the use of 
arbitration agreements outside the business-to-business context in which 
arbitrations were historically used.487  At the time the FAA was drafted, 
arbitration was used mostly in commercial transactions.  The proliferation of 
arbitration agreements in consumer and employment transactions is a more 
recent phenomenon,488 necessitating the clarification of the limits and 
standards for the use of arbitration in these contexts.  
The ability of courts to play an active role in policing the use of 
arbitration in these areas has been hampered by the Supreme Court’s 
expansive interpretation of the FAA.  As a result, courts “have largely 
abdicated their policing responsibilities.”489  Furthermore, the ability of 
states to regulate the use of arbitration in these areas is limited.  With the 
Court’s expansive reading of the FAA and the preemptive force of the Act, 
the “savings clause” is about the only mechanism available to states to 
safeguard against abuses in arbitration.490  As the Court has made clear, 

485. Id. at 103. 
486. See generally Margaret Moses, supra note 8, at 157 (arguing that the Court has 
misconstrued the FAA). 
487. See Padis, supra note 470, at 672 (noting that “the FAA’s original purpose was to secure 
enforcement of predispute arbitration in merchant-commercial contracts.”). 
488. Id. at 679-80 (discussing the proliferation of arbitration agreements in employment and 
consumer transactions in the last two decades). 
489. Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration Fairness Act: It Need Not and Should Not be an All or 
Nothing Proposition, 87 IND. L.J. 289, 301-11 (2012) (discussing the need to police abusive 
provisions in employment arbitration agreements and the failure of courts to perform this function 
adequately). 
490. See Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act by Reining in Judicial 
Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385, 388-89 (2007) (discussing the attenuated role of 
state legislatures in regulating arbitrations). 
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“Congress intended to foreclose state legislature attempts to undercut the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements.”491  
Consequently, legislative efforts to reform the use of arbitration have to 
come from Congress.  Some members of Congress have proposed bills to 
regulate the enforceability of predispute arbitration agreements in certain 
transactions, although none of these bills have made it outside the committee 
stage.492  Although these efforts have not been successful, they demonstrate 
an awareness of the need to safeguard abuses of the arbitral process. For 
example, the “findings” section of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2007 makes the case for reform: 
(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the United States 
Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial entities of generally similar 
sophistication and bargaining power. 
(2) A series of United States Supreme Court decisions have changed the meaning of the 
Act so that it now extends to disputes between parties of greatly disparate economic 
power, such as consumer disputes and employment disputes. . . . 
(7) Many corporations add to their arbitration clauses unfair provisions that deliberately 
tilt the systems against individuals, including provisions that strip individuals of 
substantive statutory rights, ban class actions, and force people to arbitrate their claims 
hundreds of miles from their homes. While some courts have been protective of 
individuals, too many courts have upheld even egregiously unfair mandatory arbitration 
clauses in deference to a supposed Federal policy favoring arbitration over the 
constitutional rights of individuals.493 
 The various iterations of the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act have 
sought to limit the availability of predispute arbitration agreements in certain 
transactions.  For example, the 2013 version provides that “no predispute 
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of 
an employment dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil right 
dispute.”494  Under this approach, these types of disputes would be amenable 
to arbitration only where the parties enter into a post dispute arbitration 

491. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). And the Court has not hesitated to 
strike down state law, as it did in Perry v. Thomas, with respect to a state law restricting the 
availability of arbitration in wage-and-hour claims. 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
492. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong.(2007); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2009, H.R. 1020 § 4, 111th Cong.(2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
493. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, id. 
494. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013 § 402(a), S. 878, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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agreement.  Presumably, at this point the weaker party would be better 
equipped to make an informed decision whether to agree to arbitrate the 
dispute.495  However, the chances of enacting the proposed bill in the current 
political climate in Washington are slim.496  
 One area in which there has been some legislative success is the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank),497 which established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB).  Dodd-Frank empowered the agency to “prohibit or impose 
conditions or limitations on the use of . . . arbitration of any future dispute 
between parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of 
conditions or limitations is in the public interest and of the protection of 
consumers.”498  The Act also requires the Bureau to study the use of 
arbitration in consumer transactions and report its findings to Congress.499  
Congress would presumably take action to address any problems identified 
in the report.  Recently, the Bureau issued final rules prohibiting the use of 
predispute arbitration agreements in mortgage and home equity loan 
contracts.500  The Bureau has also launched an inquiry to determine “how 
consumers and financial services companies are affected by arbitration and 
arbitration clauses.”501  After completing the inquiry, the Bureau “will assess 

495. For the case against restricting the availability of predispute arbitration agreement, see 
Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can be Against Fairness? The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008) (arguing that post dispute arbitration is not a viable 
alternative to enforcing predispute arbitration agreements). 
496. According to govtrack.us the 2013 bill has 9% chance of getting past the committee stage 
and 3% chance of being enacted into law. See http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1844 
(last visited Sept. 17, 2013). 
497. 12 U.S.C. § 5301. 
498. Dodd-Frank, id. § 1028(b).  Under § 1002 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Bureau is 
limited to the  consumer laws enumerated in that section. It should also be noted that the Act also 
prohibits the use of predispute arbitration agreements in mortgage and home equity loan contract.  
Section 1414(e)(1) provides that “[n]o residential mortgage loan and no extension of credit under an 
open end consumer credit plan secured by the principal dwelling of the consumer may include terms 
which require arbitration or any other nonjudicial procedure as the method for resolving any 
controversy or settling any claims arising out of the transaction.” 
499. Dodd-Frank, id. § 1028(a). 
500. The rule issued on June 1, 2013 provides that “[a] contract or other agreement for a 
consumer credit transaction secured by a dwelling (including a home equity line of credit secured by 
the consumer’s principal dwelling) may not include terms that require arbitration or any other non-
judicial procedure to resolve any controversy or settle any claim arising out of the transaction.” 
501. CFPB PRESS RELEASE (Apr. 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/pressreleases/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-launches-
public-inquiry-into-arbitration-clauses/. 
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whether imposing conditions or prohibitions on arbitration clauses would 
better protect consumers and serve the public interest.”502 
 Although the efforts in Congress to reform the use of arbitration have 
so far been met with limited success, Amex will add to the widening call for 
a broad legislative solution to the problem of access to justice in arbitration. 
CONCLUSION 
 Amex has brought into sharper focus the need to reform the FAA, 
especially as it relates to the arbitration of consumer and employment 
disputes.  These types of disputes often require the application of statutes 
designed to protect consumers and employees.  Consequently, it is crucial 
that arbitration is an effective and fair mechanism for redressing injury for 
violations of these protective statutes.  The FAA was drafted at a time when 
arbitration was infrequently used to resolve consumer and employment 
disputes.  It is therefore not surprising that it does not contain safeguards that 
guarantee that arbitration is utilized legitimately in these areas.  As 
arbitration is increasingly used as a method of resolving these disputes, the 
case for safeguards becomes evident. 
Unfortunately, Amex is the latest illustration of the Court’s 
unwillingness to provide the necessary safeguards.  It has instead chosen to 
interpret the FAA, originally conceived to promote the arbitration of 
commercial disputes, in a manner that substantially weakens protections for 
consumers and employees, and restricts access to arbitral justice.  For the 
Court, promoting the efficiency of arbitration has become an overriding 
consideration.  In the view of the Court, neither the interest in promoting 
fairness nor the need for effective redress for violations of vital statutory 
rights can interfere with the efficiency of arbitration. 
However, if the arbitral process is perceived as unfair, the public will 
begin to question its legitimacy as a mechanism for resolving disputes.  
Certainly, arbitration provides the important benefit of a flexible and 
efficient method of resolving disputes.  Nonetheless, it will continue to play 
this vital role only if the public retains confidence in the fairness of 
arbitration.  As this paper has argued, corrective reforms are necessary to 
restore the legitimacy of arbitration.  

502. Id. 
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The time has come for Congress to reform the FAA.  Because of the 
limitations the Supremacy Clause places on the ability of states to enact 
necessary reforms, states are unable to perform this function.  Additionally, 
the Court has been reluctant to interpret the FAA in a manner that would 
guarantee the fairness of the arbitral process. 
Recent decisions of the Court threaten to make arbitration “a mechanism 
easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and 
insulate wrongdoers from liability.”503  Congress should act to ensure that 
arbitration continues to perform its vital and historical function as “a way of 
using tailored and streamlined procedures to facilitate redress of injuries.”504  
  
 

503. Amex, 133 S. Ct. at 2320. 
504. Id. 
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